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LIBERAL CALVINISM; THE REMONSTRANTS AT THE SYNOD OF DORT IN 1618

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IN spite of all the volumes written about the Synod of Dort, one looks in vain for a comparison between the condemned Remonstrants and Calvin, either in doctrine or in those other distinguishing features of the Calvinism that flowed from Calvin and Geneva, and formed the working program among Huguenots, Dutch, Scotch, English, and the descendants of all four in the American colonies.

It is easy to assume that the judgment of the Synod of Dort, representative of so many Calvinistic churches and countries, must be accepted as definitive, and that the deposed Remonstrants cannot be considered Orthodox or Calvinists. The next step is usually to regard the Remonstrants as anti-calvinists and to classify them tidily under the labels 'Arminian,' 'Socinian,' 'Arian,' 'Semi-pelagian,' or 'Papist,' or even sometimes untidily by applying all these names together to some opponent, as was done to Grotius.

Whether this method is logical and historical will appear more clearly after a study of (1) the Dutch conditions and parties which caused the Synod; (2) the Calvinism of Calvin and his immediate followers; (3) the progress and outcome of the Synod.

I

The Synod of Dort was called by the States General of the Netherlands in 1618 to aid in settling the disputes, not merely theological but personal and political, that had been going on for more than ten years. The doctrinal dispute at the Uni-

versity of Leyden between the older and rigidly conservative Gomar and his younger, more liberal colleague Arminius had a strong element of personal rivalry, which did not cease with the death of Arminius. Grotius and Barneveldt and the Remonstrants (that is, those who remonstrated in 1610 against the ultra-dogmatic Calvinists), supporting a policy of peace with Spain and a republican and limited central government, were the political opponents of Maurice, Prince of Orange, and the Contra-remonstrants ("Orthodox"), who favored a more war-like policy and a strong central government under the House of Orange.

The Synod included twenty-six noted divines from the "Reformed," that is Calvinistic, churches of Geneva, Switzerland, England, the Palatinate, Hesse, Emden, Nassau, and Bremen. From the Netherlands came not merely fifty-eight pastors or professors but also a "political president" and eighteen secular commissioners representing Prince Maurice and the States General. This political element constantly exercised a decisive influence, which was regularly used against the Remonstrants. The representatives of the Remonstrants were cited by the civil power, not for discussion of their doctrine, but for defence, and only under prescriptions which, they felt, violated their rights of conscience. Like Athanasius at the Synod of Tyre, the Remonstrant delegates elected from Utrecht found that the members of the Synod were not judges but parties, and they therefore withdrew. Even the one Remonstrant who expressed his willingness to accept the drastic conditions laid down by the Synod was not given his seat.

From the history of events preceding the Synod, from the composition of the Dutch delegation, and from the reports of foreign delegates it is quite clear that the assembly was from the start practically committed to the condemnation of the Remonstrants. This was the conclusion of such observers as "the ever memorable John Hales," Dean of Windsor, and Balcanqual, James I's Scottish chaplain, both of whom came favorably disposed to the dominant party and distinctly critical toward the Remonstrants. They were, indeed, selected and instructed by King James, who had strongly urged upon the

Dutch the prosecution of the Remonstrants. The facts recorded day by day, in letters or official records, and the conclusions eventually reached by such competent observers with no suspicion of bias for the condemned Remonstrants, show a growing recognition of the severe and unfair tactics on the part of Gommar, of the Moderator of the Synod, and likewise of the secular commissioners representing the States General. The observers note unfair methods of citing the Remonstrants' writings; disregard of any opinion in the Synod favorable to the Remonstrants; and insistence upon summary action without debate in compliance with the decree of dismissal written out by the secular commissioners "before they came into the Synod," which Balcanqual calls "a trick a little too palpable." Both observers record their regret that the Synod was in other ways inadvertently giving clear evidence that the condemnation of the Remonstrants had been predetermined. A like well-considered conclusion was reached, a generation later, by Lewis Du Moulin, Puritan and orthodox Calvinist, Camden Professor of History at Oxford. Du Moulin discriminatingly points out that the sincerity of the Contra-remonstrants at Dort is not to be questioned, and that they voted as they thought and not as they were bid by the States General; but they were only permitted to be there at all because they were on the side of the dominant party in the State, which always controls the composition of such a Synod and might in this case have made it an Arminian Synod had the States General themselves been Arminian.¹

The logical corollaries of the Synod's deposition of the Remonstrant ministers were the ratification by the States General of the Synod's acts; the execution of Barneveldt, the Remonstrant political leader, four days after the close of the Synod; the condemnation of Grotius five days later; and the banishment of the Remonstrant ministers and teachers from the Netherlands. Upon the share which politics had in the deposition and banishment of the Remonstrants further light is shed by the fact that a few years later, after the death of their political opponent Maurice and the accession of a less hostile prince,

¹ *Paraenesis ad Aedificatores Imperii in Imperio*, 1656, ch. xxiii, paragraph 7, p. 624.

the Remonstrant preachers and professors were allowed to return and establish not merely churches but a Remonstrant theological seminary. Whatever doubt may lie in anyone's mind as to the precise amount of political influence involved in both the controversy and its decision, there can be no doubt that this influence was present and effective before, during, and after the Synod. It is also clear that Gomar, leader of the Contra-remonstrants, was over quick to extend the strong personal animosity he had earlier felt against Arminius to any brother, orthodox or heterodox, who ventured to differ from him in the Synod. The British delegates record Gomar's discourtesy not only to the Remonstrants and the foreign delegates but even to his own Contra-remonstrant members, one of whom he twice challenged to a duel during the progress of the Synod.²

As one follows the story it becomes increasingly clear that even in the matter of doctrine, partisanship and extraneous considerations must be recognized. Doctrine, however, fundamentally important though it be, is but a single phase of Calvinism. It is necessary, therefore, before considering the doctrinal controversies at Dort and attempting to answer the question who were the Calvinists there, to define Calvinism.

II

The answer to the question what was Calvinism is again easy if one follows the line of least resistance and uses the old hard and fast system of classification based upon a rigid interpretation of a single article or a single aspect of Calvinism. The single article would usually be assumed to be double predestination. The single aspect of Calvinism would be the theological. Predestination, however, whether single or double, was but one article of Calvin's profound theology. It was demonstrably neither primary nor fundamental in his doctrine.

In the first edition of the *Institutes* there is no double predestination, but only the ordinary doctrine of predestination

² 'Letters from the Synod of Dort,' in Hales's *Golden Remains*, 10-11; further examples of partisanship of Contra-remonstrants, 2, 4, 33, 35, 36, 57-61. Cf. Bayle, *Dictionary*, art. 'Gomar.'

of the elect. In the first creed of Calvin, drawn up for Geneva in 1537, predestination was not even mentioned; and Calvin never demanded any other creed. There was no discussion of predestination in connection with his exile or in the conditions for his triumphant recall. The Catechism of Calvin, in its revised and permanent form the official teaching of the Genevan church, contained no section devoted to predestination, and mentioned it only in connection with the petition of the Lord's Prayer, "Thy kingdom come." This is interpreted as meaning: "That He would govern His own by His Spirit, that He would prostrate and destroy the reprobate *who refuse to give themselves up to His service*, thus making it manifest that nothing is able to resist His might." The omission of any section devoted to predestination is clearly intentional, for such a section teaching double predestination had been included in the first edition of the Catechism. The omission of double predestination in the definitive editions of the Catechism and in four creeds from Calvin's hand clearly demonstrates his mature judgment that double predestination was not fundamental, and was unnecessary in a church's symbol of belief.³

This permanent expression of Calvinism in the official Catechism of Geneva, translated into ten languages, published in scores of editions, adopted or built upon by French, Scotch, English, and Dutch, and approved by the Synod of Dort, shows the fundamental principle, the keynote traceable throughout the theory and practice not only of Calvin but of his followers, conservative or liberal. That fundamental thing was not predestination, but the absolute sovereignty of God and the subordination of all else to bring about the Kingdom of God on earth. Calvin's first edition of the Institutes, his widely accepted Catechism, the Creeds drawn up by him and solemnly adopted and given symbolical authority in the sixteenth century by the Calvinistic churches in France, Switzer-

³ Calvini Opera, ed. Baum, Cunitz, Reuss, v, 346. Catechism of 1537, xxii, 46-47; Catechism of 1538, v, 346; later editions, vi, 95; 1537 Creed, ix, 693-700; cf. especially Articles 6-8, 11-12, on Faith and Redemption through Christ, and the italicized clause above, with the Remonstrants' Articles I and III. Three other creeds: for French King, Opera, ix, 715 f., for Genevan students, 1559, ix, 725 f.; for Emperor, 756 f.

land, Holland, the Palatinate, England, and Scotland were in essential harmony with the Remonstrants, who accepted the Calvinistic creeds taught in the Netherlands and adopted by the Synod of Dort. In the Scots' Confession of 1560, drawn by the fiery John Knox who had sat at Calvin's feet in Geneva, "there was no statement of reprobation, or in the second Helvetic Confession of 1566," "whose authors were decidedly Calvinistic and its doctrine undoubtedly Calvinistic."⁴ "The Thirty-Nine Articles, the Heidelberg Catechism [approved by the Synod of Dort], and other German Reformed Confessions indorse merely the positive part of the election of believers, and are wisely silent concerning the doctrine of reprobation."⁵ Yet these creeds were recognized and accepted as Calvinistic by Calvinists of both the extreme and the moderate types in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries; for it should be remembered that the Puritans of two continents and two centuries repeatedly expressed their agreement with the doctrines of the Church of England as expressed in the Thirty-Nine Articles, and that this agreement was confirmed by the testimony of the highest Anglican ecclesiastical authorities in the sixteenth and the early part of the seventeenth century.

Double predestination has been doubly overworked as a too convenient earmark of Calvinism, first by the enemies and secondly by the supporters of rigid Calvinism, both of whom might take a lesson from the simpler Calvinism of Calvin, of Knox, and of the national creeds of their day, in which double predestination does not appear.

The one principle always present and emphasized by Calvin and his immediate followers in every creed and working program was the sovereignty of the Almighty, the Eternal, whose kingdom men must pray and work to help bring about on earth, whose "Word of God" must be realized as the law of earthly kingdoms. There is no need to reproduce here the evidence for that fact. It has been the conclusion of men for two generations who have had first-hand familiarity with Cal-

⁴ Cunningham, *Reformers*, 203; Schaff, *Creeds of Christendom*, iii, 445 (Scottish), 252-254, ch. x (Helvetic).

⁵ Schaff, *Creeds*, i, 454.

vin's writings and life: the Genevese Choisy, the French Doumergue, the Dutch Kuyper, the American Williston Walker, the Scotch Reyburn, the English Irwin, the Germans from Köstlin half a century ago to Scheibe (even in a book devoted to Calvin's predestination), and recently Beyerhaus, who shows by scores of examples that what is fundamental is the sovereignty of God. This fundamental conviction deemed worth fighting for was put in simple concrete form by the citizens of Geneva, who disdained the threats of their former sovereign of Savoy and sent him word: "For the sovereignty of God and the Word of God we will hazard our lives."

When Calvin did discuss double predestination most fully, he warned against the danger of presumption in speculation as to what God had ordained before creation, and urged the sufficiency of Scripture teaching on this subject and the recognition of the general principle that "God governs everything by His Providence."⁶

More essential than any question about predestination or any purely theological article in judging whether a man or group is Calvinistic or not, is the fact that creed was only one aspect of Calvinism. There were at least five phases or aspects of historic Calvinism, all logically knit together: (1) a creed based on the Bible and emphasizing the absolute sovereignty of God; (2) church government and discipline of morals in conformity with the Word of God, honoring God above men, and enforcing the standard of his Word in daily life; (3) a form of worship free from idolatries forbidden in Scripture, yet dignified, and flexible enough to meet the test of "edification" of various kinds of people in various lands and times; (4) civil government, harmonizing with the will of God and fundamental law, safeguarding the liberties of the people protected by covenant and by divinely ordained representative government; (5) insistence upon a comprehensive, practical, social and economic program as part of the working out of the will of God, a sort of practical idealism or spirit of insisting on putting theory into practice in daily life.

This comprehensiveness of the Calvinism of Calvin is strik-

⁶ Opera, viii, 100-111, 115.

ingly evidenced in the documents in the archives of Geneva, a frontier market-town, which was made over by the wars for independence and by Calvinism from a city of merchants into an international centre, the first Puritan commonwealth devoted to gainful vocations pursued for public purposes. In 1537 the document submitted by Calvin and his colleagues to the city council was significant of his program and spirit. The resulting creed of 1537, which made no mention of predestination, logically linked together the sovereignty of God and the moral obligations of man. One element of Puritanism appears in its requirement that all citizens should swear to observe the Ten Commandments, and in its recognition that wastefulness, drunkenness, and shiftlessness are violations of God's law. In worship, Calvin developed more heartiness through congregational singing, urging the training of a children's choir to lead until their elders could learn to follow, and later securing poets and musicians to write both words and music. Church organization was demanded, with practical plans for church officials devoted to moral discipline. Civil government was touched upon in insistence upon a joint commission of clergy and laity to revise the marriage laws and to remedy injustices of the canon law.

In 1538, and again in 1541, what Calvin regarded as essential was indicated in the conditions upon which he insisted before he would return to Geneva. These included the reorganization of the church government and the safeguarding of its rights against political tyranny; measures for right relations between civil government and church; purity and freedom of worship; provision for moral discipline and sound morality.

The reorganization of state as well as church was part of Calvin's concern, and he collaborated in the revision of the civil code of Geneva in 1543. That other famous Genevan, Rousseau, in his *Social Contract*, reveals an understanding of the scope of Calvin's work. "Those who consider Calvin only as theologian fail to recognise the breadth of his genius. The editing of our wise laws, in which he had a large share, does him as much honor as his *Institutes*. Whatever revolution time may bring in our religion, so long as the love of country

and liberty is not extinct among us, the memory of this man will be held in reverence."

In the Genevan archives memoranda in Calvin's hand still exist regarding improvement in military defence, fire protection, police regulations, sewers, and weaving. There was no mention of hell-fire in Calvin's Genevan creed, but when there came up a practical question of a new scheme of central heating, it was to "M. Calvin" that the doubtful magistrates turned for advice. A picture at once official, contemporary, and concrete of the actual workings of Calvinism in the first Puritan commonwealth is to be found in the "Lawes and Statutes of Geneva," containing both civil and ecclesiastical codes, translated by an English refugee in 1562, and reprinted in England at the beginning of the Civil War and on the eve of the Restoration.

The wide range of Calvin's program in Geneva is reflected in the records of the local, provincial, and national church assemblies — all representative, and all with laymen on an equality and usually in the majority — of the Huguenots, Scotch, Irish, and Dutch; of the parishes and town corporations, of church-wardens and overseers of the poor in a score of towns in East Anglia from which came the settlers of the towns of New England, and of parliaments in Puritan England; of church, town, or vestry meetings and "General Courts" in colonial New England or Virginia; and in the educational and economic policy manifested by all these people.

In general, from the absolute sovereignty of God over all men Calvinism deduced the moral obligation of all men to society, and a consequent devotion to production and public service as part of the service of God. Two examples will illustrate this. Calvin's epoch-making teaching that interest-taking was lawful and that "ydle money is altogether unprofitable," quoted, translated, and applied by his followers, and reinforced by his teaching of "calling," resulted in the extension of credit in the great Calvinistic trading peoples, Scotch, English, Dutch, and American colonists, and in their enormously increased economic power of production. It was illustrated more fully in the teachings regarding Sunday and "calling." Man must not

merely rest on Sunday, but must do so in order that he may, like the Master-workman ("*ce grand Ouvrier*," Institutes, I, v, 10), work six days in the week, and "do all his work" in "that estate and calling to which it shall please thee to ordain me," where, "however humble his calling, each man can make his best contribution to the Kingdom of God." Boys and girls brought up on such prayers from Calvin's Catechism become social assets rather than social liabilities. On going to work they were taught to pray: "May we faithfully follow our estate and calling in pursuit of thy ordinance rather than in satisfaction of our ambition to enrich ourselves; yet if it shall please thee to make our labour to prosper, grant us the good-will to come to the aid of those in want, according to the power which thou hast given us."⁷

Whether one reads such vocational prayers of Calvin or the actual Lawes and Statutes of Geneva, providing that no one should lose his time but everyone work six days in the week according to his calling; or the homely teachings of his Genevan colleague Cordier; or the educational programs of Geneva, Holland, Scotland, the Huguenots, or the Calvinists of New England; the wise counsels of Richard Baxter in his "Christian Directory"; or the shrewd and oft-reprinted saws of Richard Steele's "Tradesman's Calling" or "Religious Tradesman"—in all these and many other like examples will be found a systematic program for everyday practical, social, and economic productivity. In his daily social and economic life, as in his religion and politics, the Calvinist was a driver, a dynamic force, militant and masculine, insistent and persistently making himself not a Mohammedan witness of fate, nor a passive Lutheran contemplator of the work of the Holy Spirit, but rather an active human agent of the divine purpose running through the ages.

Trained thus in the larger aspects of Calvinism, in the meeting-house on Sunday and at the weekly lecture; daily for six days in the week at bench, shop, farm, or loom; in the school-house, on the training-field, in the hôtel de ville or town-hall of Geneva, old Boston, or Amsterdam, or in the town-meeting

⁷ Calvin, Catechism, Opera, vi, 138.

of the newer Boston, or agitating for a town-meeting in New Amsterdam, infected by that "New England disease which is very catching" — the Calvinist of all these lands was a man whose conception of Christian citizenship involved a development of all his productive powers for the benefit not merely of church but also of commonwealth. He not only paid his bills, but produced something, put it at interest like a canny Scot or thrifty Yankee, and gave generously for public purposes. "Christianity is a busy trade," wrote the Puritan Richard Sibbes. "It is stupid to feel in oneself the power to do something well," said the Huguenot Mornay, "and not to seek means of doing it." An unknown correspondent of the Huguenot-Dutch-Puritan Lewis Du Moulin, Locke's teacher at Oxford, wrote that he would not neglect to put out at usury the talent which he had received from Du Moulin's book. If ever peoples exemplified in their lives the parable of putting their talent out at usury in both spiritual and material life it was the Huguenots, Scotch, English, Dutch, and their American descendants, the Puritans of two worlds. All these types of Calvinists "regarde also what may be expedient for the commonwealth," as the Scot Spottiswoode translated in 1616 Calvin's letter on the lawfulness of taking interest. Calvinists were everywhere more than theologians; they were founders of states which crystallized into practical, working institutions the progressive teachings of Calvinism, social, economic, political, as well as those relating to doctrine, worship, and church government. Their passionately active and persistent spirit reveals itself not merely in a remarkable body of international literature to be found in virtually every American colonial library of the seventeenth century, Puritan or Anglican, Scotch, Dutch, or Huguenot, but more concretely in an international movement of common purpose and common practice in two continents for over two hundred years.

This historic movement reveals Calvinism as much more than a creed. It was, as Kuyper called it, a "life-system," but something more, for it possessed within itself the dynamic of life, vitalizing creed, worship, moral and intellectual discipline, church organization and civil government, economics and social

ethics, developing and utilizing to the utmost God-given talents for the upbuilding of church, free public schools, military defence, and the wealth necessary for so comprehensive and costly a commonwealth. In a word, this historic movement meant public-mindedness, systematic and practical, where every man should bear his appointed part in the realization upon earth of the changeless purpose of Him whom the Calvinist was so fond of calling "the Eternal." "Calvinism's essence was the moralization of life through religion." Calvin's "lifelong aim and business were to re-wed religion and morality," is the summing up of one of the most recent writers, who recognizes that Calvinism was neither predestination nor even "essentially a systematic body of doctrine."⁸

There was something else not quite so concretely and easily definable in Calvin and his followers: a fearless spirit of re-examination of premises, a logic so thorough-going that it seems characteristic rather of the French than of the ordinary English-speaking people, but yet a quality that appears in English-speaking people of a certain type, the Puritans. This spirit may be described as that of taking the next step. Calvin not only said, "We must walk each according to his station," but also, "We must walk forward, and grow, so that our hearts may be capable of things we cannot now understand. If our last day finds us going forward, we shall learn beyond this world what we could not learn here."⁹ This not merely forward-looking but forward-moving spirit made Calvinism a growing, questioning force, bound to pass beyond any temporary creed, form of worship, or government, whether of church or state, because it always pursued Truth, "God's oldest daughter," as the Huguenot Condé described it. "The desire for investigating truth," Calvin taught, "has been implanted in the human mind." The truth should be told even if it hurt some who cannot comprehend it; for it is better "that he that can comprehend may do so, rather than not to tell the

⁸ Hunter, *Teaching of Calvinism*, ch. xvi. Cf. Choisy's valuable contributions: *La théocratie à Genève au temps de Calvin*; and his *L'État chrétien calviniste à Genève au temps de Bèze*.

⁹ Farewell to Genevan Magistrates, *Opera*, ix, 890; *Institutes*, III, xxi, 2.

truth and thereby not only prevent both persons from comprehending but also make the more intelligent of the two become worse, whereas, if he had learned and comprehended, others might learn through him.”¹⁰ “How fearful is their estate who even seem to fly from knowledge,” said Baynes, the first link in that remarkable chain of conversion to Puritanism—Baynes, Sibbes, John Cotton, and John Davenport. “God hath not stinted us to any certain degree of knowledge.”¹¹ The Puritan John Goodwin, in his defence of the execution of Charles I, held it a Christian duty “to make new patterns for others to follow”; “to enquire where others are defective”; “to remedy this by diligence in enquiry after truth.” “To oppose as error all not generally received, is to interdict growth.”

Once we realize the range of Calvinism, we escape being caught in the fine meshes of those who would set up an artificial standard, not merely exclusively theological but based on a single article of creed. In 1618, unfortunately, those who could not accept the rigid scholastic definitions of Dort on five points of speculative theology, although they agreed with all other aspects of Calvinism and even with the existing Calvinistic creeds, were rejected as not Calvinists, and were called Arminians, a term very indiscriminately used, often merely indicating an objectionable sort of person from the point of view of the speaker. It was a term of reproach, first because Arminianism had been condemned at Dort in the most widely attended international assembly of Calvinists, secondly, because in England Arminianism was condemned by Puritans and parliamentary men as savoring of the autocratic political and religious tendencies of Laud and Charles I, who in fact held views in both religion and politics quite contrary to the liberal and republican Remonstrants, or Arminians, of 1618.

The Remonstrants' views are found in their five points or articles of 1610; their interpretations in 1618 of these articles which were reaffirmed at Dort; the Confession in Dutch and Latin, 1621–22, drawn up by Episcopius, their spokesman at Dort; Episcopius' *Theologicae Institutiones*; and the *Theologia*

¹⁰ Institutes, II, ii, 12.

¹¹ Baynes, Commentaries on Ephesians, ch. i, 16–18.

Christiana of their later leader Limborch, 1686. These official documents and teachings of the recognized leaders of the Remonstrants show that on occasion, and particularly after their exile, they were ready to criticize their persecutors and censors with some Calvinistic militancy. It is, however, somewhat surprising and illuminating to find that the Remonstrants' own utterances show them to have been on the whole in accord with Calvinism not only in worship, church government, political, social, and economic program, but also in the theology of the Calvinistic creeds and catechisms before the Synod of Dort. Like Calvin the Remonstrants emphasized the sovereignty of God and the supreme duty of men to serve as instruments in carrying out his will as manifested in the Word of God. Their tenets on the sacraments, communion, and worship were regarded as essentially correct even by their severe censors, the Leyden professors, in 1630. Perhaps most surprising of all, we find the Remonstrants, from Arminius to Limborch, explicitly and repeatedly declaring their belief in double predestination, and accepting the statement of predestination embodied in the Calvinistic creed and catechism of the Dutch church. Like Calvin, however, they were not afraid to revise in the light of the Word of God (the supreme test), and for the honor of God. Arminius and his ally Uytenbogaert (who drew up the famous five Remonstrant articles of 1610) were trained at Geneva, where they received the liberal as well as orthodox tendencies, especially under the teachings of the liberal Perrot, who taught them theology and presided over the students' discussion of theses. This Genevan pastor and teacher Perrot gave to Uytenbogaert, before he left Geneva for the Netherlands, this significant advice: "Never assist in condemning any for not agreeing in every point of religion with the established church, so long as they adhere to the fundamentals of Christianity," a counsel which we shall see advocated by the Remonstrants in Holland, by John Locke — product of Puritan, Huguenot, and Remonstrant — and eventually carried out by liberal Calvinists in Holland, England, and America.¹²

¹² Brandt, *The History of the Reformation in the Netherlands*, II, 72; Borgeaud, *Histoire de l'Université de Genève*, I, 58-59.

Arminius himself in his earlier years was given hearty approval by Beza, under whom he studied in Geneva. In later life he was accustomed to recommend Calvin's Institutes, Commentaries, and Catechism as "incomparable in interpretation of Scripture." Even in his controversy with his precisian antagonist Gomar, Arminius testified "how well Calvin and Beza treated the doctrine of predestination."¹³

Both Grotius and Episcopius state that the Remonstrants' article on predestination (Article I of the five articles of 1610) was accepted at first by both sides. It was certainly legalized in the Province of Holland. After the discussion of 1611 at the Hague, the Estates of Holland gave the victory to neither Remonstrant nor Contra-remonstrant, but resolved that the five articles of the Remonstrants should remain as before.¹⁴ The view of predestination condemned by the Synod of Dort, as in so many other points, was not exactly what the Remonstrants declared to be their belief, but what was either put into their mouths or twisted from what they said, contrary to "plain grammar," as the Scotch delegate Balcanqual repeatedly noted in his letters. We can see this for ourselves by comparing the Remonstrants' own written and signed statement of belief of 1610 and 1618 with the errors rejected by the Synod of Dort. Indeed the Contra-remonstrants carried the practice so far that in one citation of Scripture they inserted (in brackets, it is true) a phrase not drawn from the Bible, in their zeal to prove the Remonstrants themselves unscriptural: "He hath chosen us [not because we were but] that we should be holy."¹⁵ In this same article the orthodox Synod condemns the doctrine of election "founded upon foreseen faith," although "foreseen" had not been used by the Remonstrants in their articles. In the fifth article the Synod condemns the teaching that "true believers who are regenerate (*vere fideles ac regenitos*) can fall into mortal sin"; but the Remonstrants in this article had not used the word "regenerate" but only "true believers." It is

¹³ Works, Nichols edition, I, 295-296; III, 656.

¹⁴ Brandt, II, 211-213.

¹⁵ Epistle to the Ephesians, 1, 4; under Article 1, section ix; Schaff, Creeds, III, 554, 583; same in official Acta Synodi by authority of States General, 1620, p. 28.

not safe to take as the Remonstrants' belief what the Synod condemned.

It is only fair, however, to indicate that the Remonstrants did make predestination conditional in the sense that election depended upon faith in Christ, and reprobation upon unbelief. It should be pointed out that even in this their purpose was Calvinistic, for they expressly sought to preserve the honor and justice of God, so that he might not be regarded as condemning men "without any intervention of sin," "without any regard to unbelief," but rather "through their own fault," an expression used by Calvin himself.¹⁶

The Remonstrants were likewise Calvinistic in their purpose to make both election and reprobation subserve the moral life in man, and in their sound but strikingly frank assertion that "all men without exception are bound to believe that they are elected to salvation" (Article V, vi, 3).^{16a} This belief that they were predestined agents of God, held by both Remonstrants and Contra-remonstrants, was no small factor in their courage in fighting Spain, and in their stubbornness in fighting one another.

From both the official records and the letters of delegates it is entirely clear that the dispute at Dort was not over the acceptance of double predestination. Both sides accepted this; but it was the Remonstrants who vainly urged the discussion of reprobation, maintained that this tended to the glory of God no less than election, and cited Calvin as an example to justify treating the two sides of predestination.¹⁷ In the reports of the sessions, private and public, contained in the letters from the British delegates, Calvin is referred to not in discussions of predestination but in those on the resistibility of grace,

¹⁶ Cf. Remonstrants' Articles I, iv, viii, and Articles III-IV, v, with Calvin, *Institutes*, III, xxiii, 9; III, xxiv, 12: "None perish without deserving it." The Remonstrants' Five Articles, 1610, in Schaff's *Creeeds*, III, 545-549, in Dutch, Latin, and English; summarized (with the five negative articles not given by Schaff) in Brandt, II, 74-75; the interpretation of the articles by Remonstrants at Dort, Brandt, III, 83-84, 87-89, 89-90, 90-94; *Acta Synodi*, I, 127-137; *Acta . . . Remonstrantium*, I, 71-83.

^{16a} Samuel Sewall held the same view: "'Twas sin for any one to conclude themselves Reprobate," *Diary*, August 12, 1676.

¹⁷ *Acta Synodi*, 135; Brandt, III, 92.

"where there are some doubts," "which Calvin himself had not thoroughly resolved." On the question, "how God can demand from man, whose power is finite, faith which is the work of omnipotence," one of the Contra-remonstrants sagely remarked, "that neither Calvin nor any of our Divines had untied that knot."¹⁸ When the Hessian delegates did note a difference, it was not in the interpretation of Calvin, but a difference between the more rigid Beza and Piscator and the more liberal Ursinus and Paraeus.

The differences between Remonstrants and Contra-remonstrants at Dort were not over the Calvinistic creeds, for these were accepted by both sides; nor over teachings of Calvin which he considered essential and incorporated in his creeds and catechism. What they differed about were speculative matters which Calvin and his large-minded contemporaries had not felt it essential to include in creed or catechism: whether election and reprobation were based on faith; whether Christ died for all or only for the elect; whether grace were irresistible; whether this grace could ever be lost. On these points Calvin was not cited by the Contra-remonstrants. In many places he might have been quoted by the Remonstrants in their favor. Later, indeed, their leader Episcopius pertinently remarked that "Calvin can be opposed to Calvin, as he uses dissimilar phrases in this matter."¹⁹ It is quite true that Calvin at different times in his life and to different audiences made different statements, which might quite naturally have been quoted on either side of such speculative questions. The conception of Calvin as never varying has been rejected of recent years on the basis of more careful investigation, and this characteristic of dissimilar, even opposing, views in his teaching has been emphasized by both German and French scholars.²⁰ As has been frequently shown by Toplady, Schaff, Hunter, Scheibe, Doumergue, and as is proved by his own utterances, Calvin had not committed himself to the extreme supralapsarian posi-

¹⁸ Balcanqual, in Hales, *Remains* (1659), 10, (1673 ed.), 111.

¹⁹ Episcopius, *Apologia pro Declaratione Remonstrantium*, ch. v, § 64; *Episcopii Opera*, II, pt. II, 141.

²⁰ Doumergue, *Calvin*, IV, 276 f.

tion of Gomar, that the decree of reprobation preceded that of the fall. Even Gomar, champion of high Calvinism as he was, did not dare to press this point to a decision, for it was clear that on this point he could not carry either his own Calvinistic colleagues, the foreign, or the Dutch delegates. In view of the many misleading statements on the subject it is desirable to emphasize the fact that the Synod did not take a supralapsarian position, and that moreover this was not a point at issue between the Remonstrants and Contra-remonstrants. The controversy over supralapsarianism was within the ranks of the "orthodox" themselves. They eventually "huddled the matter up," so that their differences should not appear in the final decision. This took the view of fallen man (*homo lapsus*) as the subject of the decree of reprobation, a view in harmony with the earlier Calvinistic creeds and therefore acceptable to the more moderate Contra-remonstrants and to the English and other foreign delegates, who had sharply disagreed with Gomar. In opposing this view, Gomar refused to sign the statements of the other theological professors, while they in turn declared their disagreement with him. That it was Gomar and not Arminius who opposed the teaching of the Dutch church in this matter was maintained by Corvinus and Limborch, and their position is justified by the evidence both of the earlier creeds and of the action at Dort.

III

To understand the discussions over the speculative questions at Dort, it is necessary to take up in succession the five articles submitted in 1610 by the Remonstrants, defended and further elaborated by them at Dort, and condemned *in toto* by the Synod. For the sake of clearness and at the risk of neglecting the more delicate shades of speculative theology, these five articles may be summarized as follows: (1) double predestination was conditioned on faith; (2) Christ died for all, but no one enjoys forgiveness but the believer; (3) fallen man is powerless to accomplish anything truly good until he is born again and his will renewed; (4) all good is dependent upon the grace of God, but this grace is not irresistible; (5)

grace is adequate, but it was not yet clear whether true believers can lose that grace. On this fifth article the Remonstrants at Dort went farther than in 1610, and asserted that true believers might fall away from the true faith. On the other hand they remonstrated in 1610 against the following points as contrary to the Word of God and not contained in the Dutch catechism and confession, viz.: that God predestined men without any regard to belief or unbelief; that Christ did not die for all men but only for those elected in the way indicated above; that in the elect the grace of God is irresistible; that those who have once received the true faith can never lose it wholly, of however great sins they may become guilty.

(1) In regard to the relation between faith in Christ and election, the Calvinistic creeds and catechisms had always been careful to connect the two, but had been content to describe the process as "elected in Christ," and to emphasize the need of faith. They had not sought to teach definitely whether God in predestination had or had not foreseen faith. These statements of the Calvinistic creeds the Remonstrants accepted. What they remonstrated against was the new teaching of the scholastics or Contra-remonstrants that God elected without regard to faith and obedience (Article I, §§ 1, 6, 7).

(2) Of the second article, the nature of the redemptive work of Christ, in which the Remonstrants said, "Christ died for all men and every man," "yet no one enjoys his forgiveness of sins except the believer," Calvin at times seemed to lay down a similar liberal view. "Our Lord Jesus came not to reconcile a small number of people to God his Father but wished to extend his grace to the whole world." Yet in view of other passages and interpretations Calvin cannot fairly be claimed as a clear advocate of universal redemption, and on this point again he did not take hard and fast ground.²¹

Even Calvin's own trusted lieutenant and successor Beza was in doubt about Calvin's meaning in his treatment of the decree of man's fall and Christ's saving work, and the subordi-

²¹ Cf. his liberal sermon on 1 Tim. 2, 3; 5-6, in *Opera*, LIII, 161, with the more exclusive interpretation in *Commentaries* on same passage, *Opera*, LIII, 268-269. the latter in Calvin, *Commentaries*, Translation Society.

nation of this decree to that on election and reprobation, and wrote asking Calvin about this.²² It is therefore no wonder that there was difference of opinion not merely between Contra-remonstrants and Remonstrants but within the Synod itself.

Whether the expression, 'Christ died for all men,' was "to be understood of all particular men or only of the elect who consist of all sorts of men, Dr. Davenant [Bishop of Salisbury] and Dr. Ward [Professor at Cambridge] are of Martinus of Bremen his mind that it is to be understood of all particular men," wrote the Scotch delegate. He himself and the two other British delegates, Carleton, Bishop of Llandaff, and Dr. Goad "take the other position."²³ The Hessian delegates also reported to their prince that differences on this point were more important than on any other article. The delegates from Hesse, Nassau, and Bremen, and even Sibrandus, orthodox professor of theology in Friesland, urged the necessity of the distinction maintained by Ursinus and Paraeus "between the sufficiency of Christ's death which applied to all men . . . and the efficiency thereof which . . . applies only to the elect." But "dissension with others who deserted Ursinus and Paraeus and followed Beza and Piscator" resulted in "canons on this matter conceived in general terms without prejudice to either party."²⁴ On this point the Calvinists who condemned the Remonstrants were themselves divided, some moving from the more inclusive teachings of Calvin, Ursinus and Paraeus, and the received creeds to the narrower scholastic interpretation of Piscator of Nassau and of Beza, who went so far as to restrict the message, "God so loved the world," so as to mean 'God so loved the elect,' a perversion of which Calvin was never guilty. The one thing on which the precisians were agreed was, as the Scotch delegate expressed it, their eagerness to "kill the Remonstrants"; on the question of redemption, the Remonstrants seem to have been as good Calvinists as their more rigid opponents, and saner theologians than these were. It was not

²² Scheibe, Calvin's Praedestinationslehre, 90.

²³ Hales, Remains, ed. 1659, 2; ed. 1673, 101.

²⁴ 'Literae del. Hassiacorum,' in Niedner's Zeitschrift für historische Theologie, 1851, p. 305.

Calvinism that the Remonstrants rejected but Bezaism. Both before and after Dort, it is Beza who is criticized by the Remonstrants, not Calvin, save in very rare instances. On the other hand the rigid Contra-remonstrants were reactionary on the extent of the love of God as manifested in Christ, a matter far more critical for the future of Calvinism and Christianity than the question of exact sequence involved in man's fall and reprobation or in faith and election. These precisians tied up "high" Calvinism to Beza's narrower view that "the saving efficacy of the most precious death of his Son should extend to all the elect . . . alone," and that his death should redeem "those only."²⁵

The Remonstrants were truer to the more liberal spirit of Calvin, whose profound vision drew the following picture: "In the person of our Lord Jesus Christ we see God as it were with his arms open to receive those who seem to be separated from him; so that he fails not to hold out to us that those who today seem to be entirely deprived of the hope of salvation should return to the flock." Coupled with this stirring conception was the practical social sense that has for centuries made Calvin and his followers missionaries in every land. "Since the work of our Lord Jesus Christ extends in general to all people," "and he invites us all to him," "should we not stretch out the hand to those who know not what that union is, so that they may draw near?"²⁶ It should be remembered that Calvin was not merely jurist and professor of theology but shepherd of souls, a man who could win the coöperation of even Jeanne the baker-woman, who gave her five sous to his university of Geneva, who knew the common people in Geneva and sometimes spoke the *argot* of their market-place; and who literally made his auditors at the back of the church sit up. Trainer of other pastors, he won men of different temper and capacity from all lands to work out his program — Knox from Scotland, Peter Martyr from Italy, Germany, and England, and St. Aldegonde from the Netherlands. A teacher "with something both pastoral and priestly," he could fascinate a young blood like Beza

²⁵ Acts of Synod, 'Second Head,' Art. VIII; Schaff, I, 587.

²⁶ Sermons on 1 Tim. 2, 5-6, Opera, LIII, 161.

fresh from his erotic poems, and turn his talent and that of a Bohemian like Marot into writing the marseillaise-like Psalms of the Huguenots. He persuaded Maturin Cordier to come to teach little boys in Geneva, and for them put a sane theology into good conversational Latin. "Good morning," says one of these Genevan lads of the dialogues of "old Cordery" to his fellow pupil, "how is your mother?" "Better," says the second. "Who cured her?" "The chief Doctor." "Who is he?" "God himself." "I have no question of that, but by whose means?" "Master Sarasin's." "What remedies did he use?" "Medicines." Calvinism had not merely profound vision, it had common sense.

(3) The third article of 1610 was reaffirmed verbatim by the Remonstrants in 1618. It is such good Calvinism and has been so often misunderstood that it deserves to be quoted in full as indicating the real views of Arminius, Uytenbogaert, Episcopius, and the Dutch Remonstrants, so unlike those views of freedom of will and reliance on good works that have been so often described as Arminian.

Man has not saving grace of himself, nor of the energy of his free will, inasmuch as he, in the state of apostasy and sin, can of and by himself neither think, will, nor do anything that is truly good (such as saving faith eminently is), but it is needful that he be born again of God in Christ, through his Holy Spirit, and renewed in understanding, inclination, or will, and all his powers, in order that he may rightly think, will, and effect what is truly good (*salutaria bona*).²⁷

This sound doctrine as part of the Five Articles was condemned by the Synod of Dort as being false (Acta, I, 323). Calvin had likewise denied just this kind of "will free for good," as both he and Augustine expressed it; and had maintained that "the will is so bound by the slavery of sin that it cannot make a move toward goodness." "Whatever good is in the human will is the work of pure grace." Indeed, Calvin, while, like the Remonstrants, he denied the freedom of the will, was more liberal than they, and he foreshadows the position of Locke and Edwards, as well as illustrates his own balance and discrimination, when he says:

²⁷ Acta . . . Remonstrantium, I, 74; Schaff, Creeds, III, 546, for 1610, which appends quotation from John 15, 5.

I have no wish to fight about the matter of free will, if it is once settled that liberty ought to be referred not to the power of choosing equally good or evil but to spontaneous motion and consent;

and again:

If liberty is opposed to coercion or force, I confess and constantly assert that the will is free. If it is called free in this sense because it is not forced or violently drawn by external movement, but is led on *sua sponte*, I have no objection to this.²⁸

(4) The fourth article of 1610 strongly emphasized the power of the grace of God, without which man cannot will any good or resist temptation, "so that all good must be ascribed to the grace of Christ." At Dort the Remonstrants strengthened this by even more explicit denial of the freedom of the will. Taken with the preceding article this seems in all fairness to clear the Remonstrants from the frequent and unjustifiable accusations that they asserted either freedom of the will or the merit of works. On the contrary, they were both Calvinist and orthodox in their emphasis on the weakness of man and on his necessity for relying on the power of God. Even in their assertion of the coöperation of grace they were not at variance with Calvin's somewhat guarded admission of coöperation. Further, the Remonstrant attitude that grace was not irresistible is in general harmony with Calvin's position that the will was not free to incline to God but was free to incline to evil; and Schweizer appears to be correct in his belief that Calvin never used the word 'irresistible' as applied to grace. Nor has the present writer found either the word or the thing embodied in any creed accepted by Calvinists as of symbolical authority, that is, adopted officially by any national church before Dort.

(5) The fifth article, which denies the perseverance of the saints, is not in opposition to any creed given symbolical authority before 1618, so far as has been discovered, with the single exception of the articles adopted by Convocation of the Irish Episcopal Church, 1615 (Articles 37, 38), and Schweizer

²⁸ Calvin, *Serv. et Lib. Hum. Arbit.*, and in his *De Lib. Arbit.*, quoted in Cunningham, *Reformers*, 498; Citations from Locke and Edwards, 498, 487. Cf. *Institutes*, II, iii, 5, 6, 13, 14, and II, ii, 26. See Locke, *Works*, 1751 edition, III, 487.

is again apparently correct in his general denial that Calvin ever uses the word 'inamissible,' that is, declares that grace could not be lost.²⁹

On the twin points of general redemption and perseverance of believers (Articles III and V), the possibility of showing Calvin in sympathy with the broader view was strikingly shown in the seventeenth century by two liberal Calvinists. Moses Amyrault, pupil of the Scottish John Cameron, at first a lawyer but converted to theology through Calvin's Institutes and later professor at the Huguenot university of Saumur, liberalized Calvin's teaching and yet preserved both it and himself within the limits of orthodoxy. He was able to meet the objections of his colleagues, and at the Huguenot synods to escape the fate of the Arminians in Holland, partly because he was somewhat less radical and made out a strong case through quoting Calvin himself, partly, it is probable, because in France no political reason called for the action demanded by the dominant political party in Holland. In sermons, pamphlets, and books written in defence of Calvin's doctrines of predestination, reprobation, universal grace, and also of particular grace, Amyrault brings out in scores of felicitously (and fairly) selected passages that Calvin "followed a *via media* and taught a universal grace which called all men to faith and repentance. Another grace which prepares men's spirits and affects them he makes peculiar to the elect."³⁰ He quotes from Calvin, chiefly from the Commentaries, scores of passages showing first that Calvin did teach the general redemptive purpose of God in Christ. Among these are the following sentences:

God desired that all people should share in his mercy and salvation.

The justice which is necessary to salvation extends to all the world.

God offers salvation indifferently to all the world.³¹

Jesus offers salvation indifferently to all and benignly extends his arms to all in order that all may have greater courage to repent.³²

²⁹ A. Schweizer, *Glaubenslehre der Evangel. Ref. Kirchen*, 1847, II, 123, 124.

³⁰ *Doctrinae de Gratia Particulari ut a Calvino explicatur defensio*, p. 1.

³¹ Calvin's Commentaries, Ezekiel 23, 32, quoted in Amyrault's *Eschantillon de la doctrine de Calvin touchant la prédestination*, Saumur, 1636, bound with *Six Sermons . . . de l'Évangile*.

³² Amyrault, *ibid.*, quoting Calvin's Commentaries, John, ch. 12; same expression used repeatedly by Calvin, e.g. Commentaries, Ezekiel, ch. 15; 18, 21-22; cf. above on 1 Tim. 2, 5-6.

Then, however, Amyrault quotes Calvin's Commentaries showing that while God calls all men, and Jesus died for all men, yet the condition of salvation was faith and that this was knit with predestination. But this doctrine (in such close harmony with the Remonstrants) was presented by Amyrault in the form of quotations from Calvin, and in such wise that he did not run counter to Calvin's sequence in faith and election. He does bring out sharply that Calvin taught a conditional rather than an absolute decree, in the sense that the decree was conditional upon faith and in that respect not absolute. Calvin in his *Treatise on Predestination*, 1552, had pointed out that just as God had threatened to punish the Ninevites and the Egyptian kings, and yet forgave and remitted punishment when they ceased to be rebels, even though his threat had appeared to be absolute and irrevocable,

so in the reverse case the promises which invite all men to salvation do not determine precisely what God has determined in his secret council, but that which he is ready and willing to do for those who are brought to faith and repentance.

The question is not whether Jesus Christ is come into the world to purge the sins of the whole world, for that is indisputable, but how this belief is to be reconciled with the contrary, that he is come that whosoever believeth in him shall not perish but have eternal life.

None can participate in Christ unless he has been adopted and chosen of God to be of his children.

Although the reconciliation made by him is offered to all, it is a special privilege of the elect to be gathered into hope of life.²³

Another significant attempt to show that Calvin taught general redemption was made on a similar basis of quotations from Calvin by the Puritan divine John Goodwin, whose book in defence of the execution of Charles I was ordered to be burnt by the Oxford decree of 1683 in company with nearly thirty other Calvinistic writings. Goodwin was accused of Arminianism, but always denied it and quotes "many full and clear testimonies of their truthfulness [the doctrines of general redemption, and of the possibility of true believers falling away] from the pen of Calvin himself." Goodwin convincingly shows

²³ From Calvin's *Traité de la prédestination*, without specific reference, quoted by Amyrault, Eschantillon, ed. 1658, 209, 211 f. Latin text in *Calvini Opera*, VIII, 300 f., 336.

that all, Calvin and Remonstrants and Contra-remonstrants, were not absolutely consistent, but at times approached one another. Where he himself approaches the Remonstrants, he holds that if his "opinion be Arminian," the ancient fathers and writers of the Christian church were generally Arminian; "yea that Calvin himself had had many pangs of Arminianism (at times) upon him; yea that the Synod of Dort itself was not free from the infection."³⁴ Goodwin, at a time when he was unquestionably a Calvinist, and had not been even accused of Arminianism, made a fine Calvinistic plea for not rejecting truth on the ground that it was new, any more than for rejecting belief that there was "an America on the ground that it had been so long unknown." He held with John Robinson "that not all scripture had yet delivered their treasure."

As to the question whether grace was resistible or irresistible, the orthodox Calvinist Paraeus advised the Synod to relegate it to the Jesuits, the authors of the distinction.³⁵ Even in the Synod itself the orthodox member Sibrandus stated that on this point "there were some doubts which Calvin himself had not thoroughly satisfied."³⁶

It is not meant by these examples to attempt to prove that the Remonstrants went on all fours with Calvin, for not even the 'orthodox' Beza, Piscator, or Gomar did that. The point is that on these speculative matters where the Remonstrants objected to new and rigid scholastic definitions, Calvin and the accepted Calvinistic creeds had not attempted to pronounce definitively. Consequently in 1618 each side might have fairly regarded itself as Calvinistic, and might be so regarded today.

If anyone finds the inclusive view of Calvinism taken in this article vague and indiscriminating, so that he would still cling to double predestination as a more distinctive test, then by the same token the Remonstrants are Calvinists on the basis of the official statements presented at Dort and of the books of their leaders Episcopius and Limborch. At Dort the Remonstrants, more fearlessly 'orthodox' than their opponents

³⁴ *Redemption Redeemed*, Preface, signatures c3^{vo} cr4^o.

³⁵ Hales, *Letters*, ed. 1659, 16-17; ed. 1673, 120.

³⁶ Hales, *Letters*, ed. 1659, 10.

on this point, insisted on discussing the two sides of double predestination for the following reasons:

Because it certainly tends much to the honor of God to think, speak, and write with truth concerning the severity of his justice, which is manifest in the business of reprobation, as well as of his mercy, which appears by his election.

Because threatenings (which are the most effectually drawn from the decree of reprobation) are no less useful and necessary to deter the hearts of men from sin, than even those comforts that are derived from the doctrine of election.

Because . . . neither have those famous men Johannes Calvinus, Beza, Zanchius, Sturmius, Piscator, and abundance more ever made any scruple of speaking their minds freely upon this point. (Brandt, III, 92, 'Reasons,' 2, 3, 6.)

If the objection be made that the Remonstrants were not Calvinistic because they denied 'absolute' decrees, it is necessary to define the Remonstrants' meaning from their own statements rather than from their opponents' accusations; and then to compare their statements with what Calvin felt it essential to put into creeds. The Remonstrants did not deny an absolute decree in the sense of denying the absolute sovereignty of God or the unchangeableness of the decree. Their first Article of 1610, like the later teachings of their leader Limborch (so heartily approved by John Locke), taught that God had decreed "by an eternal unchangeable purpose" to elect, but that this decree was conditioned on faith. In their own words, reaffirming and interpreting this article to the Synod, "the decree of God touching the salvation or perdition of every man is not an absolute decree of an end *without regard to any good or evil*," "*without respect to their unbelief or disobedience*."³⁷ Calvin himself, as Amyrault so fully proved, taught a decree conditioned on faith and in that sense not absolute. It is true that the Remonstrants in the question of the causal relation between faith and predestination did not agree with all of Calvin's writings; but they were quite in harmony with all Calvin thought it necessary to put into creed or catechism, or with what stood in the other Calvinistic creeds of the Scotch

³⁷ Brandt, II, 83-84, Art. I, §§ 2-6; Limborch's teaching "of Predestination both to Salvation and Damnation," *Theologia Christiana*, ed. 1700, Bk. IV, ch. i, §§ 5-6, p. 296, translated by Jones in *Compleat System*, Bk. IV, ch. i (II, 343).

and Dutch, and in the Heidelberg Catechism, with their constantly repeated phrase of "election in Christ." It was, then, in the sense of a decree conditioned on faith in Christ — a good Calvinistic doctrine — that the Remonstrants spoke of conditional rather than absolute decrees. Furthermore their object was to subserve God's honor, not to limit it.

If one contrasts Calvin's more simple, tolerant, and evangelical theology in his creeds, catechisms, sermons and the first edition of the *Institutes*, with the somewhat more technical and exclusive treatment in the *Commentaries* and the later editions of the *Institutes*, and then compares Calvin's two treatments with the statements of the two parties at Dort, it becomes clear that the Contra-remonstrant, or ultra-conservative, party was over-emphasizing the scholastic and more exclusive element in Calvin. The Remonstrants, the liberal party, were on the whole, with the inevitable revaluations after reinvestigation, following the liberating tendencies shown in Calvin, more markedly in his earlier writings. Different sides of Calvinism were emphasized by the two parties on points like general redemption, resistibility of grace, perseverance, where Calvin and the accepted Calvinistic creeds before Dort had wisely refrained from drawing hard and fast lines; and where Calvin and his disciples might be quoted with considerable fairness by each of two different parties, both by the rigid and by the liberal.

On the subject of the supralapsarian or sublapsarian view Calvin never "gave a formal and explicit deliverance" so that "neither party is entitled to claim him as an actual adherent." "He rather put aside these speculations and insisted on the great doctrine of predestination on which all Calvinists agreed."³⁸ When Calvin discussed predestination, even with the inner circle, the ministers of Geneva, he advised them to remember

that the councils and secrets of God are depths into which it is not profitable to plunge,

Let us be content with the Scripture.

³⁸ Cunningham, *Reformers*, 358. Similar views in Hunter, *Teaching of Calvinism*, 122; Toplady, *Historic Proof of the Calvinism of the Church of England*, I, 161.

Without presuming to enquire what God had ordained before the creation of the world, let us follow solely what is said in Scripture.

In general we must recognize that God governs by his Providence all things in such wise that his will is as it were the course of all.³⁹

In accordance with this sound principle, Calvin everywhere insisted on God's providence and used the phrase "election in Christ," no less Calvinistic because it is scriptural. If we follow Calvin, who on such speculative matters as came up at Dort declined to take exclusive ground in creed or catechism, we should include as Calvinists both Remonstrants and Contra-remonstrants. Calvin himself went so far as to publish with commendatory preface Melancthon's *Loci communes*, although, as Grotius pointed out, he differed from them on the points of controversy between the Remonstrants and the Contra-remonstrants.⁴⁰

If Calvinism had actually insisted upon only one view of all theological questions, no room could have been found for the liberal theologian Perrot in Geneva, for Paraeus in Heidelberg, for Amyrault in France; and equally little for the conservatives Trochin and Turretini in Geneva or Piscator in Nassau. In fact, both the conservative and liberal interpretations could be and were drawn from the national church creeds, and were permitted until 1618, when a peculiar political and personal situation, united with theological bitterness, forced an unnatural decision. On this earlier, sounder basis the Calvinists of South Holland had urged that matters against Piscator be "not driven on with such heats" by the French; and Duplessis Mornay, the "Huguenot pope," persuaded both Piscator's follower Dan Tilenus and his opponent Peter Du Moulin to own each other as orthodox. If Calvinism had meant simply the narrower interpretation, the good Calvinist Du Moulin would not have advocated tacitly passing by many things, "such as is the controversy moved by Piscator and many nice opinions proposed by Arminius concerning free will, the perseverance of the saints, and predestination"; nor would that equally good

³⁹ Congrégation sur l'élection éternelle de Dieu, 1551, Opera, VIII, 110-111, 115. Cf. Cunningham, 366.

⁴⁰ Brandt, II, 212.

Calvinist Paraeus have "placed the articles of a divine predestination its cause and effects, and the nature of free will, not among the fundamentals of our faith but among those decisions about which men may disagree without breach of peace or charity."

These instances, cited by Grotius in his noble plea for comprehension and toleration addressed to the magistrates of Amsterdam in 1616, show historic Calvinism before Dort to have been comprehensive enough to cover both the liberal and the conservative. Even Jurieu, the paragon of stiff Calvinistic orthodoxy, admitted that the Synod of Dort did not regard the tenets there in question as necessary to salvation or as necessarily banishing from the Church of Christ. And the same comprehensive and tolerant attitude was manifested in the action of the Dutch authorities, until Maurice for political reasons took sides with the Contra-remonstrants.⁴¹ Limborch, the later leader of the Remonstrants, shows that supporters of predestination conditioned on faith, were always teaching, preaching, and writing, basing their doctrine on the Dutch national creed; and that both they and their opponents were tolerated until the Synod of Dort.⁴² Before 1618 one looks in vain for any accepted national creed incorporating the exclusive teachings of this Synod. Nor were the Synod's decisions accepted as possessing symbolical authority by other national churches, with the single exception of the Huguenots; so that, as Rogge has pointed out, the Dutch from 1619 on were distinguished from other Calvinistic churches by the peculiar character of their creed. The Dutch Reformed Church in America wisely omits from its standards the rejection of errors and the sentence against the Remonstrants.

In worship, church and civil government, education, social and economic program, even more than in theology, the Calvinism of Calvin and his contemporaries was marked by an adaptability which enabled it to become an international movement.

As in church government and worship, so also in civil government Calvin did not hold persistently to one form. After

⁴¹ Brandt, II, 211-213.

⁴² Hist. pred. cont. in Holland., III, 4.

his wider experience in Geneva and Strassburg he made, as time went on, definite changes in government of both church and state looking toward a larger representative element. His working test in all these matters was that of "edification," which meant to the Calvinist the building up of the kingdom of God, not merely an appeal to the senses. Always there was the supreme test of maintaining God's will, his sovereignty, his Word. There might be the largest variety in worship or government of church or state, for the sake of adaptation to time, place, and people; with only one reservation constantly found incorporated in Calvinistic creed or catechism. In Geneva magistrate and simple citizen alike swore with uplifted hands to obey their own elected representatives "so far as is possible without offending God" and "in all statutes and ordinances which do not contravene the commandments of God."⁴³ The ministers swore obedience to law and magistrates with like acknowledgment of God's supreme sovereignty: "to serve rulers and people in all ways that shall not debar me from rendering to God the service which I owe him in my calling," . . . "without prejudice to the liberty which we have of teaching as God commands us."⁴⁴ So in worship decency and order were to be observed, and practical means like singing to lift up the soul to God, but there must be "no laws and constitutions made to bind the conscience, to oblige the faithful to things not commanded by God, to establish any other service of God than what he demands, or to bind to anything tending to break Christian liberty." Such was the creed of this first Puritan republic.⁴⁵

It is in such provisions as these that one catches the early liberalizing promise of Calvin and Calvinism, the larger hope, and the seeds of tolerance. Checked for a time by bitterness and disputes, and the militant spirit inseparable from a period of peril and war, the gentler and more liberal spirit sought an outlet under men like the Remonstrants, whom the too rigid Calvinists of the seventeenth century failed to recognize as true spiritual sons of Calvin and Geneva.

⁴³ 'Confession,' 1537, Opera, IX, 700.

⁴⁵ Opera, X, 1698.

⁴⁴ Opera, X, 32.

The Remonstrants in their very assertion of the duty of thinking for themselves, holding to the Scripture, maintaining the honor of God, and guarding the morals of their fellow-citizens against false reliance upon irresistibility of grace and perseverance of the saints, were Calvinists. Even in their reluctance to be bound by scholastic dogma and their assertion of the rights of conscience, they were like Calvin in his earlier period and in his creed, catechism, and ordinances for Geneva and his noble plea for Christian liberty of conscience. "No necessity must be laid on consciences in matters in which Christ has made them free." "Constitutions enacted for the purpose of binding the conscience inwardly before God" Calvin expressly condemned. The same position is taken by the Remonstrant leader Episcopius.⁴⁶ It is of even more vital significance that the passage of Calvin's Institutes on Christian Liberty, beginning, "when once the conscience is entangled in the net, it enters a long and inextricable labyrinth from which it is afterwards most difficult to escape," was quoted in full by Limborch, leader of the Remonstrants and Locke's friend and correspondent.⁴⁷ In this same book, Limborch (whom Locke rejoices to find "a theologian to whom I am not a heretic") shows the Remonstrants two generations after Dort still explicitly teaching the Calvinistic "two parts of predestination, one regarding those to be saved and the other regarding those to be damned." Limborch (like Calvin) regards "the demonstration of the glory of God as the end of predestination, of the decree of reprobation as well as of election"; and "the disproportion wherein God is pleased to communicate salvation to men," and dispenses his grace without respect to qualifications of persons, "as incomprehensible mysteries to be adored but not to be scrutinized (*adoranda mysteria nobis imperscrutabilia*) and depending upon the mere good pleasure of God."⁴⁸ Limborch's book also quotes Calvin's teaching regarding the lack of merit in man, and the merit of Christ as dependent

⁴⁶ See his *Confessio Remonstrantium*, c. XV, xxiii; *Opera Theologica*, II, 88, 92.

⁴⁷ Calvin, *Institutes*, III, xix, 7, quoted by Limborch, *Theologia Christiana*, ed. 1695, V, liv, 14, p. 554. See Locke's letter to Limborch, 10th May, 1695, in *Familiar Letters*, Works, fol. ed. 1759, III, 595; ed. 1812, X, 46-47.

⁴⁸ *Theologia Christiana ad praxin pietatis*, IV, i, §§ 5-6, 15-16.

solely upon the grace of God; and follows closely Calvin's arguments in defence of usury.⁴⁹

Calvin, the liberal Calvinists at Dort, their later leader and scholar Limborch, and the success of the experiment in toleration in Holland are links in the hitherto almost unrecognized chain of toleration which, in spite of weaknesses and apparent breaks, comes down from the earlier and more liberal Calvin through the liberal Calvinists, not only those of Holland but also those, like Roger Williams in America, Claude in France, in England Vane, Goodwin, Milton, at Oxford John Owen, Lewis Du Moulin, and their pupil John Locke, in whom all the liberal elements in Calvinism — Puritan, Huguenot, Remonstrant — crystallized and passed over to America. In the Calvinistic Netherlands, from the time of William the Silent, there was a tolerance, sometimes checked, as at Dort, but nowhere else carried out so early or on so broad a scale. Toleration marched along with the remarkable burst of intellectual, artistic, social, and political life in the Netherlands that culminated in the first half of the seventeenth century and made the Calvinistic United Provinces not merely the artistic and scholarly centre of Europe, but the greatest commercial and colonial power of that day, until she was outdistanced by another Puritan commonwealth, her rival across the English Channel.

At Dort, under a temporary abandonment of their characteristic tolerance, both sides went beyond Calvin, and debated, with a bitterness and personal animosity that disgusted the foreign delegates, over questions as to which the larger-minded Calvin had recognized finite limitations in discussing the problems of the infinite.

The modern scholar will be apt to agree with the Estates of Holland and with Grotius, who, speaking in their name in 1608, held that between Arminius and Gomar, or between Remonstrant and Contra-remonstrant, "there was no considerable difference."⁵⁰ Arminius himself held that "the points in con-

⁴⁹ Limborch, *Theologia Christiana*, III, xxi, 9, quoting from Calvin's *Institutes*, III, xvii, 1, on Usury, Bk. V, ch. xxxviii, §§ 27-31. (English translation by Jones, V, xvi, 1. Cf. *Calvini Opera*, X, 245-249.)

⁵⁰ 1608, Brandt, II, 47; 1611, 93; 1616, 208 f.

troversy between him and Gomar were not so numerous as they had been represented; that he had always confined himself within the Confession of the Dutch churches, and was still desirous to adhere to it.”⁵¹ Grotius, in an official attempt of Calvinistic magistrates to persuade men to tolerance and peace, rightly emphasized the positive contributions which each side was making rather than the denials of sound doctrine which each side somewhat sophistically put into the mouths of opponents in order to condemn them. This scholar and advocate of Holland said:

The design of the Contra-remonstrants is that we should ascribe the origin of our salvation entirely to the mercy of God, exclusive of all merits. Who can find fault with it? The meaning of the Remonstrants is that no person ought by us to be entirely deprived of the hope of salvation. This the Contra-remonstrants do not oppose.

The Contra-remonstrants seek to guard against all despair; . . . the Remonstrants to draw people off from carelessness.⁵²

A member of the Synod felicitously described the Remonstrants as *canonici irregulares*, ‘irregular regulars.’ His humor was so dry that an outsider like Hales “failed to see the sap of this wit,” and was surprised that it so deeply amused “even the gravest of the Synod.” If one may venture to probe a joke three hundred years old, the Synod saw that their indiscreet brother had blurted out the truth, and that the Remonstrants whom they were already prepared to condemn were nothing but “irregular regulars.”

Fundamental difference of doctrine was not the real ground for the excommunication and banishment of the Remonstrants. The reason for expulsion from both church and country appears as one studies the development of the struggle before 1618 and the story of the sessions of the Synod. It was a family quarrel, and the reason why the liberal and conservative Calvinists could not get on in the same church and nation was like that of own brothers in such a case: they had too many points of contact.

In Holland the points of contact between the “brothers badly split by prejudice,” as John Owen described them, were

⁵¹ Nichols, *Arminius' Works*, I, 522.

⁵² Brandt, II, 227, Grotius to Magistrates of Amsterdam, 1616.

these: a strongly personal phase of theological and academic rivalry between Arminius and Gomar; a political antagonism, personal in its nature, between Grotius and Barneveldt on the one side and Maurice on the other; a foreign question which involved the relations with Spain and also the desirability of keeping on good terms with James I, who urged the prosecution of the Remonstrants, and as Defender of the Faith threatened to take joint action with other Reformed churches if the Netherlands did not act; and an internal difference on the matter of the centralization of power in the House of Orange when the latter was facing diminished influence upon the cessation of war and war-powers. Under the Remonstrant leader Barneveldt the whole question in its combined political, religious, and personal phases was so vital to the safety of Holland that a revolution seemed to threaten. There was some violence on the part of the Remonstrants in Holland; the Contra-remonstrant ministers in that province were ousted from their pulpits; and the Estates ordered their soldiers to transfer their allegiance from the national to the provincial government. The Remonstrants even began to levy troops of their own. Prince Maurice therefore concluded that Barneveldt and his adherents, political and religious, were dangerous; and after the manner of the House of Orange he struck hard. In addition to the evidence of political influence quoted in the contemporary letters of Hales and Balcanqual, Brandt quotes other evidence of political pressure at the instance of the Remonstrants which should probably be viewed with more caution. Certainly, however, some weight must attach to the criticism of the Contra-remonstrant delegate Martinus of Bremen: "The Synod is nothing more than a political farce or comedy, in which the statesmen act the chief part." The orthodox delegate Goclenius, the *enfant terrible* who confessed the Remonstrants to be "irregular regulars," again blurted out the truth when he apologized for his conservatism on the ground that "we find that the prince and the state will have it so."⁵³

The civil magistrate will suffer none to appear on the council but such as approve their doctrine,

⁵³ Brandt, III, 283, 211.

wrote the tolerant Calvinist Lewis Du Moulin, Locke's Puritan Professor of History at Oxford;

That is what the sovereign power did very prudently in the Low Countries when they summoned a Synod at Dort.

The fathers of that Synod were not impartial . . . but were both judges and parties of favorers of one side, and consequently the Arminians could not but lose their cause before such a tribunal.⁵⁴

The answer to the question who were Calvinists at the Synod of Dort is that both Remonstrants and Contra-remonstrants were Calvinists, but of different schools, the former liberal and progressive, the latter conservative, scholastic, and rigid. "Both are right in what they admit, both are wrong in what they deny," is the judicious conclusion of Schaff.⁵⁵ The distinction between the two schools of Calvinists is made with more assurance since it is for substance admitted by four modern historians. In Geneva, Dr. Choisy — like Calvin, both pastor and professor — concludes his scholarly study of the Calvinistic Christian state at Geneva in the time of Beza with these remarks:

It is necessary to distinguish carefully between the Calvinism of Calvin and that of the end of the sixteenth or seventeenth century. The Calvinism most truly Calvinistic is that of the first edition of the Institutes and of the Catechism (p. 554).

Professor Borgeaud, to whom all students of Calvinism owe grateful indebtedness, has in his monumental history of the University of Geneva an illuminating passage on the reactionary theology of the successors of Beza, typified by the Genevan delegates to Dort ("*les épigones*," "*l'intransigeance dogmatique*"); and suggests the other side in his description of the liberal Perrot, teacher and counsellor of Arminius and Uytenbogaert (I, 337-338, 158). Blok, most distinguished and sober of modern Dutch historians, says:

Calvinism was divided from the earliest days of its appearance in Holland. In the Synods the precisians and the liberals, different fundamentally in character, were already ranged into parties.⁵⁶

⁵⁴ Paraenesis, ch. xxiii, paragraph 7.

⁵⁵ History of the Christian Church, VII, 815.

⁵⁶ Hist. Netherlands, II, ch. xxiv, p. 398.

The view of the Arminians as "a party in the state rather than a sect in the church" is confirmed by such a detached and judicious observer as Sir William Temple, who resided in Holland in 1672.⁵⁷ In America, that critically-minded investigator Professor C. A. Briggs, observes:

The Calvinistic symbols do not make the mistake of the theologians of Switzerland and Holland. The scholastic theologians of Switzerland and Holland perverted these precious doctrinal achievements of Calvinism into hard, stern, and barren dogmas by emphasizing their formal, technical, and merely external character.

In the Arminian conflict the scholastics were the bitter foes of Arminianism, and they went to such extremes of logical deduction that they sought to exclude from orthodoxy those who were more orthodox than themselves. They divided the Calvinistic camp into two parties, scholastic Calvinists and moderate Calvinists.⁵⁸

Whatever view be held as to what was the most essential principle of Calvinism, there should no longer be any doubt in the mind of historical scholars that the Dutch liberals like Arminius, Episcopius, Limborch, and their adherents, were historically a part of the great international Calvinistic movement in worship, church government and discipline, political theory, social and economic program—even in theology as embodied in the national creeds of the sixteenth century, a movement which can be traced back to the Institutes of Calvin and the institutions of the little republic of Geneva, the first example of that Puritan idea of a Commonwealth which spread through Holland, England, and Scotland to the New World.

⁵⁷ 'Observations upon United Provinces,' ch. vi, Works, 1731, I, 58.

⁵⁸ American Presbyterianism, 24.

THE BOOK OF JUBILEES AND THE RABBINIC HALAKA

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IN spite of the fact that Singer, Epstein,¹ and, somewhat later, Charles,² and Schechter have dealt with the Book of Jubilees, no apology is required for attempting to study it from a somewhat new angle.³ It is well known that much light can be thrown on the Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha by a comparison with rabbinic sources. It may be true that the Jewish traditions were not compiled till a comparatively late date, and that they were probably put in writing still later, yet much that is contained in them is of very ancient origin, and the authorities in whose names statements are quoted are a help, if not an infallible index, to fixing their date. Especially the Book of Jubilees must be viewed in the light thrown upon it by the Talmud and kindred sources, since it was doubtless written in Hebrew, contains numerous laws and allusions to Agadic statements, and presents generally the appearance of a targum or a midrash.

The book is not of Pharisaic nor yet of Sadducean origin. The former is impossible, as has been shown by Schechter, because the writer has his own views on the calendar and regarding many laws of prime importance to the Pharisees. No Pharisee would ever agree to counting the Omer — the forty-nine days separating the Passover from the Feast of Weeks — from the last day of the festival; nor would any Pharisee have agreed to fixation of the calendar otherwise than by the monthly examination of New Moon. Nor is it of Sadducean origin,

¹ See *Revue des études juives*, vol. xxii, 8.

² Dr. Charles has published the Ethiopic text of the book, and also an English translation with an excellent introduction and copious notes. I assume in the discussion below that the reader has Charles's work before him.

³ I am indebted to Professor Alexander Marx for many valuable suggestions in the course of writing this article.

since the author believes in immortality and differs from the Sadducees as much as from the Pharisees in regard to the fixation of the Omer and the Feast of Weeks. The book is the product of a sectarian, belonging perhaps to a sect that sought to bring about a compromise between the Pharisees and the Sadducees. But we must beware of permitting our ignorance of the views of the Jewish sects at the beginning of the Christian Era, of which even the names are known in but three or four cases, to blind us to the possibility, nay the certainty, that many other sects existed of which we know nothing. The Book of Jubilees gives us an insight into one of these sects, which must however remain nameless until further discovery may throw more light on the matter.

1. THE CALENDAR

One of Israel's most important institutions in its own land was the fixation of the Calendar. As is well known, the new moon was set each month by the appearance of witnesses before the court to testify that they had seen the new moon. As a lunar month consists of twenty-nine and a half days, the court, a committee of the Sanhedrin, sat during all of the thirtieth day of each month, awaiting any witnesses who might come. If none came, that day was declared to belong to the preceding month, and the following day proclaimed as the new moon of the succeeding month. The ordinary year was thus composed of 354 or 355 days. In order to reconcile this lunar year with the solar year, the Sanhedrin inserted an intercalary month every second or third year. Thus if it appeared that the month Adar, the twelfth month of the Jewish calendar, had arrived too early in the winter, a second Adar was added, so that the Passover might be celebrated in the spring. While the Sanhedrin doubtless had its system of calculations in fixing the calendar, ostensibly everything depended on the testimony of witnesses.

The author of the Book of Jubilees seeks to abolish all this. He proposes a year that shall depend only on solar time. This he intimates in the second chapter, where he informs us that God appointed "the *sun* to be a great sign on the earth for

days and for sabbaths and for months and for feasts and for years and for sabbaths of years and for jubilees and for all seasons of the years.”⁴ This verse contrasts rather sharply with the verse in Genesis which it is meant to paraphrase: “They (the sun and the moon) shall be for signs and for appointed seasons and for days and for years.”⁵ It is evident that the author deliberately proposes completely setting aside the Jewish lunar year and fixing the calendar on a solar basis.

The details of his scheme are revealed in chapter 6. The year is to consist of 364 days, that is of 52 weeks. It is to be divided into four parts of ninety-one days each. Epstein⁶ has attempted to show that the author had in mind a double system, consisting of a civil year of twelve months, of which eight were to have thirty days and four thirty-one, and an ecclesiastical year of thirteen months of twenty-eight days each. He points out correctly that in the Book of Jubilees the Feast of Weeks always occurs on the fifteenth day of the third month, and argues that since the Bible provides that the Feast of Weeks shall be celebrated on the fiftieth day of the Omer, the author must have arranged his months so as to bring the fiftieth day of the Omer always on the fifteenth of the third month. He could only do this by beginning to count the Omer on the day after the Passover (that is, the twenty-second of Nisan), as the Falashas still do today, and by limiting all months to twenty-eight days each. A simple calculation will show that this will cause the fifteenth of the third month always to be identical with the fiftieth day of the Omer.

By his scheme the author doubtless intended to put an end to one of the most bitter points of contention between the Sadducees and the Pharisees. The former held that the Feast of Weeks should always fall on a Sunday, and that the Omer should be counted from the Sabbath occurring in the Passover week. They denied any fixed date to the Feast of Weeks, claiming for it no historical significance. It was to be merely the fiftieth day of the Omer. The Pharisees, on the other hand, claimed that the Feast of Weeks celebrated the giving of the

⁴ Jub. 2, 9.

⁶ See the article referred to above.

⁵ Genesis 1, 16.

Torah to Israel, and hence must be observed on a fixed day. According to them the Omer was to be counted from the first day of Passover, so that the Feast of Weeks would always fall on the sixth of the third month (assuming that of the two months intervening one would have thirty days and the other twenty-nine).

The Book of Jubilees, by establishing months of twenty-eight days each, produced a system by which not only the Feast of Weeks but all festivals (with the exception of the Day of Atonement) would occur on Sundays. Thus if the first of the first month fell on Sunday, the fifteenth day of that month would be a Sunday (Passover), the fiftieth day thereafter would likewise be Sunday (Feast of Weeks), and so would the first day of the seventh month (Rosh ha-Shanah), and the Feast of Booths (the fifteenth of the month).

Thus far we may agree with Epstein's conclusions. It is, however, impossible to follow him in assuming that the Book of Jubilees contemplates a civil year of twelve months, of which eight were to have thirty days, and four thirty-one days. According to him these twelve months are to be divided into four parts, each introduced by a Day of Remembrance, a miniature copy of the traditional Jewish New Year. But, first, it is hardly likely that the author, who evidently is striving to simplify the calendar, would encumber it with a double system. Secondly, Epstein fails to notice that the Day of Remembrance at the beginning of the seventh month would occur in the middle (on the fifteenth) of the ecclesiastical seventh month, that is on Succoth. For in the six months elapsing between the first day of the first month and the first day of the seventh month of the civil year, the ecclesiastical year, with its shorter months, would have fallen behind by two weeks.

It is thus not possible to accept Epstein's hypothesis of a civil year. The fact seems to be that the author contemplates an intercalary week at the end of each quarter of the year. There were to be three months of twenty-eight days each, followed by a week which would complete the thirteen weeks assigned to each quarter of the year. The fourth month would be introduced by a Day of Remembrance, as would also the

seventh and the tenth, as well as the first; in every case these Days would be preceded by a week belonging to no month. Thus the year would be divided into four parts of ninety-one days each, insuring absolute regularity of occurrence for the festivals, which would all fall on Sundays.

According to our author this system seems to have come into being only after the deluge. Before that time the months would appear to have consisted uniformly of thirty days. Thus in regard to the deluge we are told, "The water prevailed on the surface of the earth five months, one hundred and fifty days."⁷ That this was the belief of the writer of Jubilees is further seen by his story of the creation. Adam is represented as having been created on the sixth day, and taken to the Garden of Eden forty days thereafter, that is on the forty-seventh day of the creation. Now after the completion of seven years, "seven years exactly, and in the second month, on the seventeenth day,"⁸ Adam committed the sin for which he was expelled from Eden. As the day of his sin was the anniversary of the day of his entrance, he must have entered Eden on the seventeenth day of the second month. As we have seen above, this was the forty-seventh day of creation. Hence it follows that originally the month was to consist of thirty days.

The view that the world was created in the first month is that of R. Joshua in the Talmud.⁹ R. Eliezer, however, his colleague, held that it was created in the seventh month. The latter view is the one that has gained widest acceptance in Jewish circles, having been introduced into the liturgy by Rab.¹⁰

The four Days of Remembrance, which the author of the Book of Jubilees places at the beginning of the first, fourth, seventh, and tenth months, were to be days of judgement, just as is New Year's day in rabbinic literature. This is seen from the fact that while Adam sinned on the seventeenth day of the second month, he was permitted to abide in Eden till the first day of the fourth month,¹¹ that is till the next Day of Remembrance. We should note that in the liturgy New Year's

⁷ Jub. 5, 27.

¹⁰ Additional Prayers for Rosh ha-Shanah.

⁸ Jub. 3, 17.

¹¹ Jub. 3, 32.

⁹ Rosh ha-Shanah 11a.

day is regularly called "the Day of Remembrance." In giving that name to these four days, the author is simply raising the dignity of the first days of the first, fourth, and tenth months to that occupied formerly by the traditional New Year's.

It is possible that in creating these Days of Remembrance the author was influenced by the tradition that puts the number of New Year's days at four. The Mishna reads:

There are four New Year's days: on the first of Nisan is the New Year for kings, and for festivals; on the first of Ellul is the New Year in regard to tithes of animals; . . . on the first of Tishri is the New Year for years, for sabbatical years, for jubilees, in regard to planting [the prohibition of the use of the fruit of the first three years], and for [the tithing of] herbs; on the first of Shebat is the New Year for trees according to the school of Shammai, but according to the school of Hillel it is on the fifteenth of that month. At four times in the year is the world judged: on Passover, regarding the grain; on the Feast of Weeks, regarding the fruits; on New Year's all mankind pass before him as in a legion; . . . and on Succoth they are judged concerning the rain.¹²

The early Mishna doubtless did not specify the dates of the New Year's days or of the judgement days, and they may have been identical. There can, however, be no doubt that the author's four Days of Remembrance are in some manner connected with the tradition crystallized in the Mishna.

Roensch tries to find another reference to the four Days of Remembrance in the story that the author tells of Jacob sending gifts to his mother "four times a year, between the times of the months, between ploughing and reaping, and between autumn and rain, and between winter and spring."¹³ It looks at first glance as if the author had the four Days of Remembrance in mind. The theory is the more acceptable as New Year's day was of old a time for the interchange of gifts,¹⁴ and our author would naturally transfer that custom to the Days of Remembrance. But even Charles hesitates to subscribe to this explanation. A second reading of the verse sees only three pairs of seasons mentioned, for we cannot assume the words "between the times of the months" to refer to any particular season.

The passage can best be understood in the light of a statement in the Talmud. In an ancient baraita,¹⁵ the year is

¹² Rosh ha-Shanah 1, 1.

¹³ Jub. 29, 16.

¹⁴ Neh. 8, 10.

¹⁵ B. M. 105b.

divided into six seasons: Sowing, Autumn, Cold, Reaping, Summer, Heat. It will be noticed that the Book of Jubilees also mentions six seasons: Ploughing, Reaping, Autumn, Rain, Winter, Spring. While these seasons are somewhat different from those of the Talmud, the underlying division of the year into six parts is the same. The reading "four times" is doubtless the error of a scribe who understood the passage as Roensch did, but there can hardly be a doubt that he was mistaken.

In spite of the efforts of the author of the Book of Jubilees to emphasize the equality of the four Days of Remembrance, he seems on one occasion to forget himself and to allude to the first day of the seventh month as a Day of Remembrance for the whole year rather than for three months. Thus he tells us that Abraham sat up all the night of the first day of the seventh month "in order to observe what would be the character of the year in regard to rain."¹⁶ This is of course strongly suggestive of the talmudic story¹⁷ of the man who slept in a cemetery on the eve of Rosh ha-Shanah, and obtained valuable information concerning the weather conditions of the following year by listening to the conversation of spirits. Similarly R. Zebid claims that one may know the character of a coming year by observing weather conditions on New Year's day.¹⁸ Such beliefs must have been so current that the author inadvertently included them in his book even though they conflicted with his own theories. Charles's explanation that Abraham obtained information for only six months is hardly tenable and does not meet the difficulty, for if the author had clung to his four Days of Remembrance, it would not have been possible to discover anything about the future that was more than three months distant.

2. THE SABBATH

While, as we have seen, the writer of the Book of Jubilees endeavored to introduce far-reaching changes in the Jewish calendar, his differences from the traditional law in regard to the Sabbath are generally in the nature of undue severities.

¹⁶ Jub. 12, 16.

¹⁷ Berakot 18b. Compare also Abot d'R. Nathan, ed. Schechter, p. 16, chapter 3.

¹⁸ B. B. 147a.

In some cases he seems to echo an ancient halaka that has left only indistinct traces in rabbinic literature. Like many other sectaries, his regulations concerning the sabbath are much more severe than those of the rabbis. He is not satisfied that the violation of the sabbath should be merely a capital offence, but insists that one who desecrates the holy day forfeits his share in the future life. "Whoever does any work thereon shall die eternally,"¹⁹ is plainly a paraphrase of the biblical, "Whoever profanes it shall surely die, for whoever does any work thereon, that soul shall be cut off from the midst of his people."²⁰ It is noteworthy that while the conclusions of this author often differ from those of the rabbis, his methods are the same. His peculiar interpretation of this verse was doubtless due to his sense of the awkwardness of the redundancy in it. Very little is added by declaring that the soul that profanes the sabbath "shall be cut off from the midst of his people," after it has already been said, "whoever profanes it shall surely die." The rabbis felt the same difficulty, and explained that the offender is to be "cut off from the midst of his people" in cases where there is not sufficient evidence to convict him.²¹ They interpret the 'cutting off' to mean premature or childless death. The author of the Book of Jubilees rejects their interpretation — or perhaps he lived before it arose — and explains that the punishment of 'death' relates to this life, that of 'cutting off' to the future life. Such interpretations of redundancies are not uncommon in rabbinic literature. When Isaiah says to Hezekiah, "Set thy house in order, for thou shalt die and not live,"²² he means according to the rabbis²³ that Hezekiah had forfeited his life in this world, and would not live in the future world.

The author of Jubilees does not tire of sounding the praises of the sabbath. It was celebrated in heaven before it had been

¹⁹ Jub. 2, 27.

²⁰ Exod. 31, 14.

²¹ Mekilta ad loc. In the Talmud the words "he shall be cut off" are interpreted as meaning the forfeiture of future life in the case of one guilty of blasphemy. See Sanhedrin 64b. The cases are however not completely parallel, since in the Talmud it is the repetition of the word that is used as the basis of interpretation. The same interpretation is there given in Ps.-Jonathan to the verse.

²² Is. 38, 1.

²³ Jer. San. 10, 18; f. 28c.

revealed to man. On earth, however, it is the exclusive possession of Israel. "The Creator of all things did not sanctify all peoples and nations to keep the sabbath on it [*sc.* the seventh day], but Israel alone; them alone did he permit to eat and drink and to keep the sabbath on it on the earth."²⁴ This view, that the observance of the sabbath was a privilege bestowed on Israel, has its parallel in the Talmud. The Lord is represented as having said to Moses, "A fine gift have I in my treasures, the sabbath is its name, and I desire to give it to Israel. Go and announce it to them."²⁵ Moreover the rabbis looked upon the sabbath as the bride of Israel. R. Simeon b. Johai gives expression to the common feeling in these words:²⁶ "Every day has its mate. Sunday is coupled with Monday, Tuesday with Wednesday, Thursday with Friday. The sabbath has no mate among the days. It is espoused to Israel. For one not a Jew to observe it after the manner of the Jews would be equivalent to adultery." In all likelihood this feeling is the basis of the strong aversion of the rabbis to gentile observance of the sabbath.²⁷ Yet one important distinction is to be observed between the objection of the rabbis to the observance of the sabbath by gentiles and the words of the Book of Jubilees. In this sectarian book only the joy of the sabbath is forbidden to gentiles, nothing is said of abstention from work; but to the rabbis it seemed objectionable that the gentile should observe the sabbath even in abstaining from work. Perhaps the author was thinking of the Babylonian sabbath with its taboo, and expressed his view that the gentiles might observe the sabbath in their own way but should not imitate the Jewish manner of observance.

The author is not content with generalities about the sabbath, he gives in some detail what ought to be the laws of the sabbath. In the last chapter of his book he draws up a list, or rather lists, of actions which are not to be performed on the sabbath. In the first list we read (following Charles's translation):

Whoever desecrates that day, whoever lies with his wife, or whoever says he will do something on it, that he will set out on a journey thereon in regard to

²⁴ Jub. 2, 31.

²⁵ Sabbath 11b.

²⁶ Bereshit R. 11.

²⁷ Sanhedrin 58b.

buying or selling, and whoever draws water thereon which he has not prepared for himself on the sixth day, and whoever takes up a burden to carry it out of the tent or out of his house, shall die.²⁸

Again somewhat later:

And every man who does any work thereon, or goes on a journey, or tills his farm, in his house or in any other place, and whoever lights a fire, or rides on any beast, or travels by ship on the sea, whoever strikes or kills anything, or slaughters any beast or a bird, or whoever catches an animal or a bird or a fish, or whoever fasts or makes war on the sabbath, shall die.²⁹

The reason for dividing the prohibited actions into these two groups is not at all clear. The prohibition of marital relations on the sabbath is practically unknown in rabbinic literature.³⁰ Nor does the author state the grounds for his prohibition. The inclusion of this law sheds no light on the classification of the prohibited actions.

That our author should condemn a man to death for merely saying that he will desecrate the sabbath is inconceivable. Yet the clauses, "whoever says he will do something on it, that he will set out on a journey thereon in regard to buying or selling",

²⁸ Jub. 50, 8.

²⁹ Jub. 50, 12.

³⁰ Perhaps a reference to this prohibition may be found even in the Talmud. In a baraita, quoted Ketubot 3b, we are told that originally it was customary for marriages to take place on Wednesdays. Since the time of the persecution the people developed the custom of celebrating them on Tuesdays, and "the rabbis did not interfere." But "on Monday one should not marry, but if it be because of some compelling reason, it is permitted. And they separate the bridegroom from the bride on the first Sabbath eve because he causes a wound." That the baraita consists of more than one stratum is evident from the expression, "on Monday he may not marry, but if it be³¹ because of some compelling reason it is permitted." As a matter of fact only the most compelling of reasons brought about the change from Wednesday to Tuesday. It is therefore clear that this is a later modifying statement, added when Tuesday also had become a dangerous day. The words "because he causes a wound" look very much like a gloss; they can only be explained if they refer to a marriage celebrated on Friday, but no such marriage is contemplated in the baraita. The text seems originally to have had reference to the prohibition of marital relations on the sabbath. In order to make certain that the sabbath would not be violated in this respect, the bride and groom were to be kept apart for the first sabbath eve after their marriage. Similarly in the case of mourning, if the death occur during the course of the married life, the husband and wife are not necessarily separated. But if it occur during the first week of their wedded life, they must be kept apart (Ketubot 4a). If this interpretation of the baraita be correct, the baraita must be very old in its basic form, for already in the days of the schools of Shammai and Hillel the law was obsolete (Niddah 10, 1).

certainly imply that view, if we are to accept the editor's reading. The text, however, as Charles notes, seems not to be in good condition, for two out of the four manuscripts used by Charles omit the word 'thereon' in the second half of the verse. If we take the phrase 'on it' to refer to the act of saying (reading 'whoever says on it that he will do something,' etc.) we have a definite statement which is to some extent in consonance with the rabbinic halaka. For in the Talmud it is clearly forbidden to say on the sabbath that one intends to do such and such work during the week.³¹ But in the Mishna the planning of work for a week-day, far from being a capital crime, is considered merely a transgression of a rabbinic injunction. It is true that the prohibition is based on a prophetic verse,³² but that would not suffice to make it a biblical law.

Charles considers it awkward that the author should prohibit the drawing of water "which one has not prepared for himself on the sixth day." But if we bear in mind the rabbinic law, we see that we have here nothing more than the author's customary extension of the Pharisaic law. In the Talmud it is forbidden to use anything on the sabbath which at the coming of the holy day, that is at nightfall on Friday, was not 'prepared' for use.³³ Apples which fell from their tree on the sabbath or an egg laid on the sabbath may not be eaten till the sabbath has passed. It is not a very serious extension of this rule to consider water which has not been previously drawn as 'unprepared for the Sabbath' and therefore unfit for use.³⁴

The last clause of this verse prohibits the taking up of a burden with the intent to carry it out of one's tent or out of one's house. Now taking up a burden with the intention of carrying it is not quite the same as carrying it. It may constitute the necessary preliminary to the performance of the act, but it is not the act itself. According to the Talmud this preliminary is rabbinically prohibited, but no biblical transgression is involved unless the full act is performed by setting down the article that has been taken up.³⁴

³¹ Sabbath 23, 3. Cf. T. B. ad loc.

³² Isaiah 58, 13.

³³ See Sabbath, chap. 18.

³⁴ Sabbath 1, 1.

Turning to the second list we find mention of acts of quite a different character. To go on a journey on the sabbath was even in later times held by some to be biblically prohibited,³⁵ and in earlier times this opinion may have been held more generally. The verse, "Let no man go forth from his place,"³⁶ may have been taken literally. Indeed that going on a journey was held to be one of the major prohibited actions we can see from the fact that in the first verse planning to go on a journey is put on the same level as planning to do any other kind of work.

That riding a beast on the sabbath was held to be one of the major prohibited acts follows from the statement in the Talmud that in the Maccabean period a man was stoned for riding a horse on the sabbath.³⁷ The rabbis who hold that riding an animal is only rabbinically forbidden explain that this was a temporary extension of the law. But there is no reason to doubt the fact which is related; and it is unlikely that any court at any time would have presumed to execute a person for a crime which everyone knew to be slight. It is beyond doubt that originally riding was considered biblically prohibited.

Travelling on board ship on the sabbath was in later times considered wrong.³⁸ It was not permitted to set sail for three days before the sabbath lest one be compelled to remain aboard on the holy day. It is not unlikely that in earlier times this was counted among the severer classes of prohibited actions.

To kill or wound an animal was held by the rabbis to be one of the thirty-nine classes of prohibited labor.³⁹ Similarly capturing a living thing was included among the thirty-nine categories. On the other hand fasting on the sabbath, while discouraged, was never looked upon as an infringement of the sabbath law.⁴⁰ Indeed under certain circumstances it was considered justified. The earlier view may have been more stringent in this regard. It is, however, noteworthy that it would be against Jewish tradition to execute a person for a transgression

³⁵ Erubin 17b.

³⁶ Exod. 16, 29.

³⁷ Yebamot 90b.

³⁸ Sifre Deut. ed. Friedmann, 111b; Jer. Sabbath 1, 8.

³⁹ Sabbath 7, 1.

⁴⁰ Sabbath 11a.

like fasting, which involves no action. Mere inactivity is as a rule not punishable, certainly not in human courts.⁴¹ It is, therefore, reasonable to assume that our author is here inserting what he thinks should be the law rather than what he knows to be the general opinion.

Making war on the sabbath certainly involves the transgression of many sabbath laws, but to make it a category by itself is peculiar. The insertion can be understood only in view of the leniency in this regard introduced by the Maccabees.⁴² Our author is simply protesting against the new usage and is urging a return to the pre-maccabean halaka.

3. OTHER FESTIVALS

The sabbath is of course the most important Jewish festival; hence in this matter there are more points of contact between the halaka of the Book of Jubilees and rabbinic tradition than at any other, but Jubilees also contains numerous passages regarding the other Festivals that can be better understood in the light of rabbinic sayings. We have seen how the author fixed the date of the Feast of Weeks in such a way as seemed to him to satisfy both the Pharisees and the Sadducees. Another interesting reference to a peculiar regulation concerning the Feast of Weeks occurs in the story of Jacob. The characteristic offering of the Feast of Weeks was that of new grain.⁴³ It is here said that during the famine Jacob found himself unable to procure new grain for the offering, and therefore brought old grain.⁴⁴ Now the question of whether in case of emergency old grain may or may not be used for the offering is a matter of dispute among the rabbis. The Mishna ⁴⁵ insists that only new grain may be used; a baraita quoted in the Talmud ⁴⁶ permits the old grain.

In regard to Succoth, the Book of Jubilees seems also to have retained the older halaka. Thus we are told that Abraham built booths for himself "and for his servants."⁴⁷ Now accord-

⁴¹ The only cases where punishment is threatened for neglect of duty in Jewish law are those of the paschal lamb and of failure to be circumcised.

⁴² 1 Maccabees 2, 41.

⁴⁴ Jub. 44, 4.

⁴⁶ T. B. Menahot 83b.

⁴³ Lev. 23, 16.

⁴⁵ Menahot 8, 1.

⁴⁷ Jub. 16, 21.

ing to later rabbinic law ⁴⁸ women and slaves are exempt from the law requiring all to live in booths during the festival week. But even in the Talmud there seems to be a recollection of the ancient law, since mention is made of the fact that Queen Helena of Adiabene, who became converted to Judaism about the year 30, had a Succah at Lydda.⁴⁹

4. TITHES, AND FRUIT OF THE FOURTH YEAR

Perhaps nowhere does the Book of Jubilees reflect an halaka differing more widely from that of the rabbis than in the matter of Tithes. The various rules about tithes are scattered in the Pentateuch, and their interpretation was difficult.⁵⁰ The rabbinical system of tithes was as follows. On the first and second years of the sabbatical cycle, as well as on the fourth and fifth, two tithes were brought from all produce. The first was given to the Levite; the second might be eaten by the owner, but nowhere else than in Jerusalem. In the third and sixth years of the seven-year cycle the first tithe was given to the Levite, and instead of taking the second tithe to Jerusalem it was called 'the tithe of the poor,' and was to be distributed among the needy of the vicinity. The Levites who received the first tithe were obliged by law to give a tithe of their tithe to a priest. During the Second Commonwealth it often happened that the Israelite would give his first tithe to a priest ⁵¹ instead of to a Levite. On the propriety of this the talmudic authorities are divided.

The system of tithes in the Book of Jubilees is entirely different. The first tithe is given not to the Levite but to the priest.⁵² The latter must then set aside one tithe of this tithe and take it to the temple, where it must be eaten by priests within a definite time, namely before the arrival of the new crop. This 'tithe of the tithe' is called 'the second tithe.'

Practically in the same category with their second tithe the rabbis place the fruits of the fourth year.⁵³ The fruit of any

⁴⁸ Succah 28a.

⁴⁹ Succah 2a.

⁵⁰ The passages to be compared regarding the biblical law of tithes are Lev. 27, 30-33, Num. 18, 21-32, Deut. 14, 22-29; 26, 1-15.

⁵¹ Succah 45a.

⁵² Jub. 32, 9-11.

⁵³ Maaser Sheni, chap. 5.

tree for the first three years after it is planted is forbidden by the biblical law, and may not be eaten, but that of the fourth year is to be "holy for the giving of praise unto the Lord."⁵⁴ The rabbis interpret this as meaning that the fruit is to be eaten by the owners in Jerusalem. In the Book of Jubilees, however, it is decreed that, having been offered at the Sanctuary, it is to be eaten by "the servants of the house of God before the altar."⁵⁵ Thus our author, too, treats the fruit of the fourth year in the same way as the 'second tithe' of his special system. As usual Jubilees mentions a specific instance of the application of this law; the biblical personage who is reported to have observed the law of the fruit of the fourth year is Noah. The fruit of the first three years he did not use; that of the fourth year he kept till the new moon of the first month of the fifth year.⁵⁶ This would imply that under no circumstances is the fruit of the fourth year to be eaten before the coming of the fifth year. While this is not expressly stated among the laws of the fruit of the fourth year, no objection can be drawn from the omission, as the text there is incomplete. In the Talmud no reference is found to any such law, but R. Aha of Shabha (eighth century), in his Sheeltot,⁵⁷ tells us that even if the fruit of the fourth year be redeemed it may not be eaten till the fifth year. A similar view is expressed in the Halakot Gedolot⁵⁸ (of the same period), and although R. Samson of Sens (twelfth century)⁵⁹ spurns the statement as the gloss of an ignorant copyist, one cannot safely set aside as mere ignorance a law found in two of the oldest codes. It is not impossible that there was a tradition in regard to the matter which for some reason found no expression in the Talmuds.

5. LAWS OF SACRIFICE

In regard to the law of Sacrifice we find another striking parallel between the Book of Jubilees and the accepted rabbinic halaka. According to the law of the Bible the peace-offering

⁵⁴ Lev. 19, 24.

⁵⁶ Jub. 7, 37.

⁵⁵ Jub. 7, 36.

⁵⁷ קדושים, No. 100.

⁵⁸ Halakot Gedolot, end of laws of ערלה, does not occur in the text published by Hildesheimer.

⁵⁹ Commentary on Maaser Shenì 5, 7, cf. Tos. R. H. 10a, catchword ופרות.

may be eaten on the day of the sacrifice and on the morrow.⁶⁰ What is left until the third day is to be burned. It is questionable whether the law ought not to be interpreted as permitting the eating of the meat on the night following the second day, for the meat need not be burned till the morning of the third day, and generally in the case of sacrifices the night follows the day. This is, however, denied by the rabbis, who limit the time of eating to the coming of the second night. This is likewise the law in the Book of Jubilees, where we are told: "Eat of its meat on that day and on the second day, and let not the sun on the second day go down upon it till it is eaten, and let nothing be left over till the third day."⁶¹

6. SOILING THE PRIESTLY GARMENTS

An interesting law is that prohibiting priests to permit their clothes to be soiled with blood while they are serving in the sanctuary.⁶² In the Talmud we also read: "If his clothes were soiled while he was performing the service, his action is unfit."⁶³

7. COVERING THE BLOOD

One of the most strongly emphasized commandments in the Book of Jubilees is that which deals with the prohibition of eating blood.⁶⁴ According to our author the law requires the covering of the blood of beasts, cattle, and whatever flies. This is in consonance with the Karaite halaka rather than with the rabbinic law, which excludes from the application of this rule domestic cattle, like oxen and sheep, limiting it to the beasts of the field and birds.

8. LAWS OF MARRIAGE

Our author does not confine himself to mere matters of ceremonial. He deals also with matters social. Thus he holds it to be highly commendable to marry a cousin, especially the daughter of a father's brother. Mahalalel seems to have been the first to introduce this custom,⁶⁵ and perhaps this was the

⁶⁰ Lev. 7, 16.

⁶² Jub. 21, 10.

⁶⁴ Jub. 7, 29; 21, 16.

⁶¹ Jub. 21, 17.

⁶³ Zeb. 35a.

⁶⁵ Jub. 4, 15.

reason for his being numbered among the saints.⁶⁶ Indeed even in the Bible we frequently find mention of the custom of marrying one's cousin. At the behest of Moses the daughters of Zelophehad marry "the sons of their uncles."⁶⁷ It is interesting to note that in the Talmud it is recommended to marry a niece, especially the daughter of a sister.⁶⁸ The custom of marrying a cousin probably sprang from the desire of maintaining the family unity and family property, and is therefore likely to be the older view.

That a father may give his daughter in her minority in marriage to anyone of his choice⁶⁹ is a well established principle in Talmudic law.⁷⁰ But that right does not descend to the sons after the death of the father.⁷¹ Our author, however, writes: "If anyone gives his daughter or his sister in marriage to one of the descendants of Canaan he shall surely die."⁷² This implies the right to dispose of a sister in marriage. That this was the older view there can be no doubt. It was only as part of the rabbinic emancipation of woman that it was prohibited. In order to protect the orphan girl, the rabbis ordained that after the death of the father the mother of a girl and her brothers may with her consent give her in marriage to anyone of their choice, but that if on reaching her majority she refuse to remain with him, she is thereby released from him.⁷³

9. CASES OF BILHAH AND TAMAR

From the fact that the author of Jubilees makes Jacob appoint Levi to act as priest for him it is clear that he does not regard the patriarchs as priests. Otherwise there would be no meaning in Jacob's giving tithes to Levi. Therefore, according to the accepted halaka, there would have been no reason for Jacob's abstaining from Bilhah because of Reuben's outrage upon her

⁶⁶ Jub. 19, 24.

⁶⁷ Num. 36, 11.

⁶⁸ Yeb. 62b.

⁶⁹ The age of majority for females is given in the Mishna as twelve years; Niddah 5, 9. That this is the case would be implied in Jubilees 30, 2, where it is stated that Dinah was twelve years old at the time of the rape. This seems to be based on the use of the word הנערה, which is always interpreted by the rabbis to refer to a girl for the first six months after reaching her twelfth birthday.

⁷⁰ Kid. 41a.

⁷² Jub. 30, 7.

⁷¹ Kid. 16b.

⁷³ Yeb. 107b.

honor, for in the rabbinic halaka a woman does not become forbidden to her husband merely by reason of rape,⁷⁴ and unless he be a priest it is only faithlessness on her part that can compel divorce. Yet our author insists that after that incident Jacob had no relations with Bilhah.⁷⁵ This would seem to agree with the Karaite halaka, which forbids marital relations with any woman who has been dishonored against her will.⁷⁶ That this was the older custom is attested even in the Bible,⁷⁷ where David abstained from his concubines after their defilement by Absalom.⁷⁸

Somewhat analogous to the case of Bilhah is that of Tamar. The rabbis found difficulty in explaining why she should have been ordered to be burned. Even granting that until she was released from her brother-in-law she was considered a married woman, and so liable to capital punishment, yet the penalty for adultery in the case of a married woman is strangling and not burning. The rabbis explain the matter by assuming her to have been the daughter of a priest, identifying Shem with Melchizedek.⁷⁹ But the author of the Book of Jubilees does not seem to be acquainted with that genealogy. To him Tamar is "one of the daughters of Aram,"⁸⁰ which probably means not that she was a Canaanite woman, but one of the descendants of Aram, son of Shem. In order to justify Judah, our author makes Abraham command: If any woman "commit fornication among you, burn her with fire."⁸¹ He knew very well that this was not in accord with Mosaic legislation, and

⁷⁴ Ket. 51b et al.; cf. Sifrè Num. 5, 13.

⁷⁶ Revel, Karaite Halacha, p. 34.

⁷⁵ Jub. 33, 9.

⁷⁷ 2 Samuel 20, 3.

⁷⁸ In Jer. Sanhedrin 2, 3, there are conflicting opinions as to whether David voluntarily abstained from them or was legally forbidden to have relations with them. But even the authority maintaining the opinion that it would have been prohibited, only holds that view in regard to a king, not in regard to other people. The Babylonian view seems to have been that the concubines were suspected of having acquiesced in the wrong of Absalom against his father. This is at any rate the view of Tosafot, Git-tin 6b, catchword עבוי. Professor Ginzberg has called my attention to Ps.-Jonathan, Deut. 22, 26, where the view is expressed: "And unto the maiden shall ye do no harm, the maiden is not to be punished by death, but her husband shall divorce her with a writ." So that here too the plea of compulsion would not save the wife from divorce.

⁷⁹ Bereshit R. chap. 85.

⁸⁰ Jub. 41, 1.

⁸¹ Jub. 20, 4.

is merely saying that before the revelation a stricter law prevailed.

10. INTERMARRIAGE

The rabbis trace Judah's troubles to his sin in having deceived his father by feigning that Joseph had been killed by a wild beast.⁸² The writer of Jubilees, however, finds the source of his troubles rather in his transgression of the commandment not to marry a Canaanite woman.⁸³ For, unlike the rabbis, our author takes the word 'Canaanite' literally, not as meaning simply 'merchant.' The result of this forbidden marriage was that when Judah insisted that his son marry one of the descendants of Aram, the son preferred to marry into the family of his mother.⁸⁴ When he was finally induced by his father to marry a woman whom he did not like, he vented his hatred and his anger on her. He was punished by early death. The second son, who performed the levirate marriage at the father's behest, committed a similar sin and was similarly punished.

Now Abraham had warned his children against marrying Canaanite women.⁸⁵ Likewise Rebecca was warm in her denunciation of mixed marriages.⁸⁶ But it is in connection with the outrage on Dinah that we are finally told that it is one of the laws of the Heavenly Tables that one may not give a daughter to a non-Israelite.⁸⁷ The punishment for the sin is stoning, and the woman is to be burnt by fire.

The prohibition against this crime is found in an allegorical interpretation of the verse, "And of thy seed thou shalt not give to pass through to Molech."⁸⁸ An echo of this verse is found in our book, where it reads, "For of his seed he has given unto Molech."⁸⁹ The same interpretation of the verse is found in Ps.-Jonathan to the verse, but it is quoted with condemnation in the Mishna.⁹⁰ Since the punishment for "passing one's seed through to Molech" is stoning, that is to be taken as the penalty prescribed in our book for the transgression of marrying a Canaanite woman.

⁸² Ps.-Jon. Gen. 38, 25.

⁸³ Jub. 41, 2.

⁸⁴ Jub. 41, 2.

⁸⁵ Jub. 20, 4.

⁸⁶ Jub. 25, 1.

⁸⁷ Jub. 30, 9.

⁸⁸ Lev. 18, 21.

⁸⁹ Jub. 30, 10.

⁹⁰ Meg. 25a.

11. IMPURITY AFTER CHILDBIRTH

Among the first laws referred to in the Book of Jubilees is that declaring a mother ritually unclean after childbirth. This is mentioned in connection with the entrance of Adam and Eve into the Garden of Eden.⁹¹ Adam was created during the first week, Eve during the second week; for this reason a mother is declared to be impure for one week after the birth of a son, and two weeks after the birth of a daughter. Adam did not come into Eden till forty days after his creation, and Eve not until eighty days after she had been created; therefore a woman may not go into the temple for forty days after childbirth if the child be a son, and for eighty if it be a daughter. The connection between the time of the entrance of Adam and Eve into the garden and the permission to a woman to come into the temple is not at all clear. It might be more evident if the child, as well as the mother, were held to be unclean, but in the Talmud this is certainly not the case. Nor does the Book of Jubilees make any reference to the uncleanness of the child. Furthermore, while Eve was presented to Adam in the second week of his existence, yet there were no marital relations between them until the end of the first Jubilee.⁹² We are not told the reason for this abstinence; it is certainly contrary to rabbinic tradition, which assumes that both Cain and Abel were born in Eden.

12. CIRCUMCISION

Charles believes that when our author insisted that circumcision must be performed on the eighth day, he was declaring his objection to the rabbinic law that permits under certain circumstances the postponement of the performance of the rite for several days.⁹³ Thus if the child be born on Friday at twilight, the rite is to be performed on Sunday, which would be actually the tenth day after his birth. If that day be a festival, the ceremony is to be observed on the following day, the eleventh of the child's life. If, as might happen even in Palestine in the case of New Year's day, that day, too, be a

⁹¹ Jub. 3, 10.⁹² Jub. 3, 34.⁹³ Jub. 13, 14.

festival, the child is to enter the covenant of Abraham on Tuesday, the twelfth day after his birth.⁹⁴ The underlying principle is plainly stated: it is not permitted to violate the Sabbath except when it is certain that the child was born on that day; when the matter is in doubt, the rite must be performed on a week-day. It is unlikely that the author of the Book of Jubilees would protest against that law. If he had had it in mind, he would probably have referred to it clearly. It is far more likely that our author is following the Bible, and is merely emphasizing the importance of the eighth day as the proper time for the observance of the rite.

13. THE LAW OF RETALIATION

While we find development in nearly all branches of Jewish law between the times of the Bible and those of the Talmud, perhaps nowhere do we find so radical a change as in regard to the law of Retaliation. The old law of "an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth," is practically abolished by the rabbis, and money payments substituted.⁹⁵ The only rabbi who insists on the old law is R. Eliezer, but even his words are interpreted by the later authorities so as to agree in principle with the new opinion. In the Book of Jubilees the full rigor of the law is insisted on. Indeed, it is even extended, so that a murderer is to be executed in the same way in which he disposed of his victim. Thus Cain is punished for killing Abel with a stone by having a house fall upon him, for "with a stone did he kill, and with a stone was he killed."⁹⁶ While this is accepted by the rabbis as a theological concept — 'measure for measure' — yet it is nowhere affirmed as a legal maxim.

14. THE NOACHIC LAWS

We have thus far discussed the laws that apply to Israel alone, but Jewish tradition has also a code of laws that apply to all men, which are generally referred to in the Talmud as the seven laws of the sons of Noah. In the Tosefta we are told that the sons of Noah were given seven commandments. They

⁹⁴ Sabbath 19, 5.

⁹⁵ Baba Kamma 84a.

⁹⁶ Jub. 4, 31.

are: to institute judgments (civil law), against blasphemy, against illicit sex relations, against murder, against robbery, and against eating the limb of a living animal.⁹⁷ We notice that, although we are told that there were seven, on counting those mentioned we find only six. In the Talmud seven are actually mentioned, for beside the prohibition against blasphemy there is a special law against idolatry.⁹⁸ In the midrash only six are mentioned and only six are promised in the heading.⁹⁹

In the Book of Jubilees¹⁰⁰ the sons of Noah are commanded to observe six laws; but these are only partly identical with the Noachic regulations of rabbinic literature. "To observe righteousness" might be a fair equivalent to 'dinim,' or civil law. The second of the laws given in the Book of Jubilees is "to cover the shame of the flesh." This is of course considered the basis of morality in the Talmud, but it is nowhere raised to the dignity of a law. Our author, living in days of hellenistic tendencies, with the heathen gymnasia as a thorn in the side of Israel, looked upon this law as one of the highest importance. "To bless the Creator," the third of our author's Noachic laws, may be a mistranslation for the term ברכת השם, which is a euphemistic expression for blasphemy, and the phrase would therefore originally have meant not a positive commandment to bless the Lord but a prohibition of saying anything derogatory against him, which is actually one of the seven Noachic laws of the Talmud. The injunctions to honor one's parents and to love one's neighbor, which are two of the author's six Noachic commandments, are not found in the Talmudic list at all. Yet among the rabbis the universality of these two laws is upheld. Thus we are told that the extent to which one must go in honoring one's parents may be learned from a gentile in Ashkelon who preferred to lose a great profit rather than to disturb his father's sleep.¹⁰¹ In regard to the commandment to love one's neighbor, attention need but be called to the state-

⁹⁷ Aboda Zara, chap. 9, ed. Zuckerman, p. 473.

⁹⁸ Sanhedrin 56a.

⁹⁹ Bereshit R. chap. 16; cf. Pesikta, ed. Buber, p. 100b, where some manuscripts read שבע and some שש, but all agree in enumerating only six commandments.

¹⁰⁰ Jub. 7, 20.

¹⁰¹ Kiddushin 31a.

ment of Ben Azzai that the verse, "This is the book of the generations of man," contains a deeper truth, for it includes all men in a universal brotherhood.¹⁰² The last of the six laws of the Book of Jubilees, "to guard against fornication," is of course merely a paraphrase of the law against illicit intercourse which in the Talmud also is one of the Noachic commandments.

The tone of the six laws as they are set down in the Book of Jubilees seems decidedly older than that of any of the lists in rabbinic literature. There can be no doubt that originally there were only six laws, and that later a seventh was added in order to obtain a round number. In the Tosefta the influence of the current phrase, 'seven Noachic laws,' was strong enough to cause the scribe to insert it in the text, but he could not add commandments which were not before him.

We have thus seen how many of the passages of the Book of Jubilees are made more intelligible by a comparison with the traditions of the rabbis. A comparison of the agadic passages of the book with those of the Talmud would yield even more plentiful fruit. Much has been done in this regard by Charles, but much yet remains. We are handicapped in dealing with this book, since we have it only in the form of a translation; yet it is a well at which the student of the Scriptures and of the development of both Jewish and Christian theology must drink deeply.

¹⁰² Jer. Nedarim, 9, 4.

ÉMILE BOUTROUX

LUCY SHEPARD CRAWFORD

ITHACA, N. Y.

I

By the death, on November 22, 1921, of Émile Boutroux, France lost one of her most distinguished sons; the world, a mind of rare philosophic insight and power. Born, July 28, 1845, in a period of materialism and scientific dogmatism, Boutroux was a courageous and far-seeing leader, recalling men to the life of the spirit, and to a true estimate of the human soul.

During the greater part of the nineteenth century France was divided into two opposing camps — the clericals and anti-clericals, their antagonism embittered by the political situation and by the social and intellectual history of the preceding centuries. For the most part, the anti-clerical, or 'scientific' party maintained ascendancy among the intellectuals. True descendants of the age of enlightenment, they regarded religion as a combination of ignorance, superstition, and hypocrisy. Faith they had in good measure, but it was a faith reducible to mathematical terms, bounded by discursive reason. For them scientific truth was the whole truth and the only truth; anyone who questioned this was either a fool or a visionary — and the two epithets were often considered synonymous. The man who proclaimed a belief in truths beyond the reach of factual experience was either ignored by the intellectual élite or accused of attempting to undermine the validity of scientific laws and methods, and of seeking to impede the beneficial progress of scientific investigation. "No man can serve two masters," was the cry of both parties. Thus Ernest Havet (1813-1889):

The science of nature is essentially irreligious, since religion is confused with the supernatural.

In the midst of this bitter and stubborn feud Émile Boutroux grew to manhood. The atmosphere of irreconcilable difference

between the church and science he found hard to breathe, even in his early student days. When only twenty-nine years old, we find him in his doctor's thesis of 1874¹ protesting against the dogmatism and self-sufficiency of science. How much he accomplished toward effecting a reconciliation, toward restoring the religious spirit to its rightful place, while at the same time sustaining the integrity and importance of the scientific spirit, history alone can tell. At any rate his whole life was devoted to the task. Renouvier (1815–1903) and Ravaisson (1813–1900)² and Secrétan (1815–1895)³ had pointed the way, but it was Boutroux who actually blazed the trail with vigor and determination. Recalling the conditions in France, we cannot fail to honor the spirit and tenacity of the man in the difficult situation in which he found himself. Interesting it is to note the testimony of one of his own countrymen:

Le problème religieuse a passionné M. Boutroux, dans un temps où il semblait du bon ton de réserver de telles préoccupations aux âmes faibles, aux femmes et aux enfants. Il y avait autant de courage que d'utilité à reprendre, même sur des bases nouvelles, l'étude de ces éternels problèmes.⁴

While perhaps more widely known for his theory of the contingency of the laws of nature and his insistence upon the freedom of the human soul, Boutroux also holds a high place among the historians of philosophy. The spirit in which he approached his historical studies can best be given in his own words:

As to the actual source of the history of philosophy, that is found only in the monuments left by the philosophers themselves.

Each philosophic work is to be considered in its ensemble and in its details. . . . In this way likewise we undertake to understand a drama, a poem, or a work of art. . . . The historian who is in quest . . . of an

¹ *De la Contingence des Lois de la Nature*. Translated into English by Rothwell, 1916.

² Ravaisson, also, had protested against the rigid, all-inclusive mechanism of science, on the ground that it sought to reduce everything to a quantitative identity, and thus found no place in its scheme for variety, spontaneity, and creation.

³ Secrétan declared, "I am what I will." Ruggiero observes, "The unconditioned affirmation of the principle of liberty which we find in Secrétan is of great importance in the history of French thought, for it expresses a presentiment . . . of subsequent developments." *Modern Philosophy*, p. 136.

⁴ La Fontaine, *La Philosophie d'Émile Boutroux*, p. 58. Compare also Gaultier, *Les Maîtres de la Pensée Française*, p. 47.

adequate appreciation of a great man's work will endeavor more and more to impress upon his own mind the thought of the author, by reading all his works over and over a great many times. He will want to see things from his author's point of view, investigate with him, follow him in the détours of his meditations, share his philosophical emotions, and enjoy with him the harmony where his intellect found peace.

Philosophic systems are living thoughts. Only by searching in books the means of resuscitating these thoughts can anyone hope to understand them.⁵

As an historian Boutroux clearly followed his own precepts. So successful was he in living through the thought of the great thinkers of the past that he seems literally to have made his own spirit one with theirs. From Heraclitus and Anaxagoras to Kant and Hegel, each philosopher is a living personality to him, a friend to whom he delights to refer. From each he seems to have borrowed something, though it be only a nuance. Perhaps among the Greeks he is most at home. With Hegel, too, he finds himself in substantial accord. Whether this was due to their common source of inspiration or to more direct influences, it is hard to say and probably futile to inquire, but again and again we find their minds marching together *pari passu*; almost invariably they breathe the same atmosphere and view reality with the same breadth of vision.

With Leibniz Boutroux shares the notion of the hierarchy of realities. With Spinoza he longs for the *amor intellectualis dei*; with Pascal he sounds the depths of religious experience and feels the charm of mysticism. With Kant he exalts the power of duty and the moral law, as the mainspring and categorical imperative of human activity. And in spite of his attacks upon positive science Boutroux must forever remain a disciple of the father of modern science, Descartes — “le Français véritable fils de l'Esprit.”

Was Boutroux then an ‘eclectic’? Yes, in the broadest sense of the term. He borrowed largely from his spiritual brothers of all ages; he sought truth wherever it was to be found, and made it his own. “Un grand esprit ne cherche pas à être nouveau et original, il cherche la vérité.”

One of the most remarkable things about Boutroux is that the main tenets of his philosophy crystallized so early. In his

⁵ Études d'Histoire de la Philosophie, pp. 8-9.

doctor's thesis of 1874 can be found, in embryo at least, virtually all the ideas which his later works developed and amplified. "La Contingence des Lois de la Nature" remains his *magnum opus*. In his preface to the English translation (1916) of this work, we find the following interesting admission:

When in 1874 I presented this thesis at the Sorbonne for my doctor's degree, I had no conception that it would create attention after so long an interval, all the more so as the idea I set forth at that time seemed paradoxical and very unlikely to be taken into consideration.

The position which Boutroux maintained in his thesis concerning the relation of science to reality was adhered to throughout his later works. In 1914 he summarized his views as follows:

No absolute coincidence exists between the laws of nature as science assumes them to be and the laws of nature as they really are. The former may be compared to laws proclaimed by a legislator and imposed a priori upon reality. The latter are harmonies towards which we ascertain that the actions of different beings really tend. . . . In the reality of things, the rigid, eternal mathematical order, which science considers from its own point of view, serves to obscure an order that is invisible, supple, and untrammelled, and therefore all the more beautiful.⁶

Thus again and again we find him declaring with Heraclitus:

ἁρμονίη ἀφανὴς φανερῆς κρείττων.

To seek this inner harmony is the function *par excellence* of philosophy. Science can never find it.

In the constructive part of his philosophy Boutroux posited 'contingency' as the negative, and 'liberty' ('la raison libre') as the positive aspect of reality. Man's reason is free, supple, "vivante." The universe is governed by necessity, to be sure, but by a moral rather than a mechanical necessity. Man's actions are not determined by a mechanistic scheme of things given once for all. He is *attracted* by a something not yet given and which may never be given in its perfection. At one and the same time he feels that he must ('devoir') act in a certain manner and also that he is free ('pouvoir') to act otherwise. This all but irresistible 'force vitale,' which directs but does

⁶ Author's preface to Rothwell's translation of *De l'Idée de Loi Naturelle dans la Science et la Philosophie Contemporaine*.

not compel man's actions, and which is also inherent in the lowest forms of life, Boutroux calls 'la finalité' — a force based on ethics and aesthetics, rather than on physics.

This notion of 'finality' permeates all reality. Boutroux refuses to admit the existence of 'brute matter' or of purely physical phenomena. We think we see only mechanism in what we call the blind forces of nature, in instinct and in habit. But ultimately these mechanic actions are based on freedom, and are guided by the principle of finality.

Animal instinct, life, physical and mechanical forces are, as it were, habits that have penetrated more and more deeply into the spontaneity of being. Hence these habits have become almost unconquerable. Seen from without, they appear as necessary laws. . . . The apparent constancy of these laws finds its reason in the stability inherent in the ideal itself. One might say that the being tends to remain stationary in the form it has once assumed, because it first sees this form under the aspect which participates of the ideal: it takes delight in the form and tends to continue it. This is what in man is called habit.⁷

In his religious life Boutroux seems to have found himself at home in Christianity, but he was always careful not to press his particular faith upon others. What he did urge, with all the ardor and fire of his Gallic spirit, was that man, as man, must look beyond factual experience, beyond the limits of positive science, and must seek the "Beyond that is Within."

II

The world in which Boutroux found himself, when he first began to exercise his powers of original thought, was almost completely dominated by the spirit of positive science, and negatively by an utter lack of reverence for the Invisible and the Intangible. The apostles of modern science had invaded the most sacred precincts hitherto denied them, and were claiming control over all forms of human experience. Descartes, Francis Bacon, and Newton were the great prophets of scientific thought; Darwin's hypothesis had set the world on fire, and was enthusiastically hailed and cherished as one

⁷ Contingency of the Laws of Nature, translated by Rothwell, pp. 192, 195. Similarly, Hegel: "The habit of right and goodness is an embodiment of liberty" (The Philosophy of Mind, par. 410).

more confirmation of the claims of positive science and the mechanistic theory. The intellectual world was dominated by Kant and Hegel (not yet adequately interpreted), by Auguste Comte, John Stuart Mill, and, somewhat later, Herbert Spencer, whose doctrines all tended to treat the empirical facts of science as all-inclusive and equivalent to ultimate truth.

Kant had left intact the world of phenomena as the field of science — a world dominated by absolute mechanical necessity, subject to mathematical laws. The inadequacies of this conception by itself were clear to the philosopher of Königsberg. Over and above the phenomenal world, therefore, he placed the world of noumena, intangible but none the less real, where liberty and the moral law reigned supreme. With this dualism Boutroux was not content. For him reality was a whole; any such attempted division was an unmeaning abstraction.

For science, theoretically and a priori, everything depends upon natural laws. In the last analysis these laws are reducible to mathematical terms. There is no such thing as chance; for every effect there must be a given measurable and commensurate cause. Many causes in nature, to be sure, are so minute and so complex as to be as yet beyond human grasp; nevertheless, the man of science would say, some universally necessary natural law (or cause) does exist, whether or not that law is as yet within the reach of human intelligence. Thus the man of science would agree with Spinoza (though for quite different reasons) that "a thing can in no respect be called contingent save in relation to the imperfection of our knowledge."

Nevertheless, as Boutroux points out, all science must posit three major presuppositions which, from its point of view, can only be explained as the result of chance:

1. In the first place, science must necessarily accept *existent realities* as already given; science must have facts, observable phenomena, as its working basis, as the material upon which its laws may operate. Their particular nature, the cause of their existence — precisely why they are thus and so, and not otherwise — is matter only for conjecture, not for precise scientific assertion or measurement. Even modern science, with all its great development during the past century, has not yet

been able to solve the age-old problem: Which came first, the chicken or the egg? Given one or the other, science can make progress, but without that beginning there could be no science. Phenomena once given, science can analyze them, but it can never create them or explain their creation. Once analyzed, or "réduit de plus en plus à de la poussière de l'être," the phenomenon is no longer whole, it is no longer real, it is merely an abstraction.

2. Secondly, science presupposes an *ordered* universe, and ordered in a particular way — a universe regulated by certain immutable natural laws, governed by mechanical necessity. Why human experience is so organized, and not otherwise, scientific researches cannot explain, nor does the man of science attempt such an explanation. Here, again, for science, it seems to have been a matter of chance. As matter of fact, science is tending more and more to emphasize the resemblances and uniformities in phenomena, rather than their diversities. With the advance of science, natural laws are reduced in number, and are gradually being converted into merely quantitative relations. The ultimate aim seems to be to continue this reduction and conversion until at last one irreducible quantity shall be found in terms of which the whole universe may be explained.⁸

3. Finally, science assumes that *new phenomena* are being constantly produced in the world. On this presupposition science seeks to look into the future, based though its view is, and must be, on empirical data. By way of explanation, science merely relates the new to the already known, and seeks to reduce the changing to the immutable.

On the basis of this analysis, Boutroux finds that

l'être, l'ordre, le nouveau, raison d'être et base de la science, sont, par elle, réduits, déformés, anéantis. La science est comme le philosophe facétieux de Voltaire, qui dit à l'Être, dont il doit fournir l'explication:

Pardonnez-moi . . .

Mais je pense, entre nous, que vous n'existez pas.⁹

⁸ Yesterday the 'atom' seemed to be such a quantity; today it may be the 'electron'; tomorrow perhaps 'ectoplasm.'

⁹ 'Hasard ou Liberté?' Fourth of a series of eight lectures delivered by M. Boutroux at Harvard University, 1910, under the title 'Contingence et Liberté.' Published in *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*, XVIII, 2, 1910, pp. 137-146.

Once in possession of these data, science rigorously refuses to countenance the possibility of chance or of any occurrence beyond the purview of mechanical necessity. The scientist qua scientist does not concern himself with the ultimate origins of things. The fact that things exist in the phenomenal world can be observed and tested by virtue of their uniform relations — this is enough for the man of science. But man as man, as a rational, free being, Boutroux believes, must inquire further. “La raison est scandalisée par l’apparence du hasard,” which, be it remembered, for Boutroux is only appearance. It is the function, *par excellence*, of philosophy to fathom the depths of reality by other means than scientific observation and deduction. “L’homme, qui a fait la science, y est-il enfermé?”

In thus challenging the position of modern science, Boutroux sought not to discredit its findings, or to question its value to mankind and the importance of its continued progress. Rather, his protest was raised against those over-zealous scientists who would reduce the universe to a mere mechanism governed by rigid physical necessity; who would place all things under the aegis of science; and who insist that science is our only source of knowledge, and that there can be no truth which cannot be expressed in mathematical terms. Science, to be sure, exists, and “in its own domain it defies all attacks. What more is necessary to render it inviolable? But is science our only source of knowledge?”¹⁰ This last question our philosopher answers most emphatically in the negative.

Another source of knowledge, more certain, more nearly infallible than science, is the human reason — the *bona mens* of Descartes, at once practical and theoretic, at once spontaneous and controlled. The reason of the free man is not limited by the evidence of the senses or of the abstract dialectic, but is the necessary foundation and guarantee of them both.

Science can deal only with facts as they are presented here and now. Reason, in this broader sense, through the continuity and regular development of phenomena perceives progress inseparable from identity; its mission is to control and to judge as well as to know. It “grows through feeding upon

¹⁰ Ibid. p. 142.

scientific knowledge and upon practical experience." The principles of reason cannot be formulated once for all; rather do they march rhythmically through the ages, keeping step with the moral and intellectual history of mankind.

Les principes de la raison se résument, . . . comme l'avaient vu les Grecs, dans la notion de la convenance et de l'harmonie, superposée à celle du possible et du réel. C'est au nom de ces principes que la raison repousse l'idée d'un monde qui devrait au hasard son existence et ses lois.¹¹

III

With the ancient Greeks, science and philosophy were bound together with hoops of steel, and practically indistinguishable. In a word, science was the spirit which discovered itself in the order of nature.

Thus Anaxagoras:

πάντα χρήματα ἦν ὁμοῦ· εἴτα ὁ νοῦς ἐλθὼν αὐτὰ διεκόσμησε.

But with Francis Bacon, Galileo, Descartes, and Newton a new conception of science arose. Henceforth natural science was to be considered a law unto itself. Beyond experience and the laws logically deducible from empirical facts science had no interest.

Through the influence of Descartes's teachings, science gradually extended its area of investigation and, as it claimed, of dominion over those aspects of life which formerly had belonged to the realm of spirit — sensation, consciousness, social phenomena, life itself. "Pour la science, désormais, il n'est plus, en droit, de mystère dans la nature."

Then came the parting of the ways for science and philosophy. For modern science thinking is merely one of many natural phenomena.¹² Of those problems which science cannot solve, no one has the right to seek a solution. Science thus has proclaimed 'le néant' of philosophy. Philosophy, on the other hand, can no longer accept the compromise of a dualism with

¹¹ Ibid. p. 143.

¹² For an extreme point of view, see John B. Watson, "Psychology from the Standpoint of the Behaviorist," 1919. For this writer thought is merely the "action of language mechanisms"; "thought processes are really motor habits in the larynx"; reasoning is a special form of language habit.

science. To complicate the problem, science has become 'specialized,' with the result that in modern times there is no longer one comprehensive science but many — each with postulates based ultimately on intuition.

Facing this situation, Auguste Comte sought to make philosophy the synthesis of the many sciences. This position Boutroux declares untenable (as it has proved to be), because in such a rôle philosophy either becomes altogether scientific or remains philosophy, that is, unscientific in the narrower modern sense of the word. Nor is it possible to consider philosophy merely as one of the sciences, on a par with mathematics, astronomy, physiology, and the rest. *Prima facie*, philosophy and positive science travel different ways; the former proceeds from principles to facts, the latter from facts to principles. "Philosophy is essentially of the concrete and the whole, as science is essentially of the abstract and the part."¹³

The claims of modern science Boutroux summarizes as follows:

1. The only way to find truth is by means of empirical facts and logic.
2. The domain and jurisdiction of science is all-inclusive.
3. Let no one pretend to know where science professes ignorance.
4. There is no certainty except in science. Nothing is knowable for man but what can be scientifically known.
5. Science teaches better than anything else the worship of truth.
6. Therefore scientific study is the necessary and sufficient culture.
7. There is no essential faculty of the human soul which science does not direct in the best way.

If these claims were to be allowed, and science enthroned as the sovereign all-powerful, what would be the result, asks Boutroux. This is the gruesome picture he gives us:

1. Our aesthetic, moral, and religious ideas and ideals would be discarded as belonging to the realm of superstition, routine, and error, for the function of science is to eliminate the sub-

¹³ Bosanquet, *The Principle of Individuality and Value*, p. 33.

jective (moral and social) instinct, and to resolve it into the objective.

2. Science recognizes no social relations other than those resulting from the division of labor.

3. Extreme specialization would result.

4. External coördination would take the place of present community feeling.

5. Everything which constitutes the true essence of man science seeks to reduce to an infinite number of energy-units. In its effort to "explain" man by means of analysis and reduction, science succeeds only in suppressing him.

If science is to be our only guide, this is the goal we march towards, and we ought to measure human progress by the extent to which humanity is dehumanized.¹⁴

IV

Let us now see what Boutroux has to offer us in place of this "scientific" world. In its essence his concept of reality is based upon Hegel's "concrete universal," the one in the many, unity in difference; or, as Bosanquet says, a whole "within which identity and difference are distinguishable but inseparable points of view."¹⁵ So, for our philosopher, the world is essentially variety and multiplicity dominated by free, spontaneous reason, guided by moral law.

By 'reason' in this sense is man's conscious life governed. But reason is not something transcendent, standing above or without man; it is within him, an essential part of his innermost being — it *is* man as man.

'La vie consciente' or 'la conscience,' for Boutroux, is not the mere consciousness of the individual, based on instinct, tradition, and subjectivity; but a consciousness controlled by reason — by a reason which has been ripening and objectifying itself through the ages, by a reason which is the harmonious expression of man's intelligence of all time and for all time, and which therefore transcends the particular. For man is not a stranger, not a 'monstre,' in the universe. He belongs to it,

¹⁴ Science and Culture, p. 21.

¹⁵ The Principle of Individuality and Value, p. 40.

and has a universal value. The dictates of his intelligence, which have found expression through the ages, must therefore partake of the universal.

Man's conscious life is made up of (1) feeling ('le sentiment'), (2) intelligence, and (3) will ('volonté'). Feeling is the simplest form of life; through it man first becomes conscious of his existence. Through his intelligence man seeks to find an eternal living harmony in the world-order. By his intelligence man shows himself free, and above the beast.

Finally, man is possessed of a free, creative will which finds expression only when united with intelligence and feeling. The self of which we are conscious is not an inert, given entity; it is ever growing, ever changing, yet ever persisting. It changes through our conscious effort. And so with the external order.

In the individual this creative power is most clearly manifest in the genius, who seems to break the bonds of mechanical laws, to transcend the experiences and accomplishments of the great mass of men. And yet the creative impulse can also be observed in the baby and in societies. We need only turn to history to see how mankind has ever been impelled by some force more powerful than scientific laws, more impelling even than mechanical or logical necessity. Logically sound perhaps was the plea of military necessity on the part of the Germans during the Great War. Yet there was found to exist a force in the human soul far superior to the force of formal logic. So in other great movements in the world's history men have exerted seemingly superhuman strength and endurance in their desire to reach an ideal goal. Whether the ideal be religious, political, aesthetic, moral, or social, it raises men to unbelievable, undreamed of heights of creative power and attainment.

Similarly in our daily life. Our *bona mens* insists not only that we live (i.e. feel) and have our being in an ordered universe of which we are an integral, intelligent part, but also that we are endowed with creative power.

In the conscious life . . . we find not only being and order, but also creation. In vain are we furnished with abstract arguments to prove the impossibility of a creative liberty. As matter of fact, we persist in creating freely in the realm of feeling, of thought, and of action; and we come to the con-

clusion that the objective and material liberty which has been proved impossible, is nothing but the imaginary materialization of the living liberty that exists and operates in us. . . . While science is striving to reduce nature to the form of the intellectual abstraction (*eadem sunt omnia semper*), at the same time it recognizes that experience must always be consulted to ascertain to what degree nature actually conforms to this injunction. An explanation of this situation will be found if the world which science analyzes and reduces, complies in its creation with other than scientific laws — with the laws of liberty, one with feeling and living intelligence.¹⁶

With Leibniz, Boutroux conceived of a hierarchy of realities. The various stages of the hierarchy he developed dialectically, and designated somewhat arbitrarily as follows:

1. The World of Causes, 'le premier échelon de la hiérarchie,' in which the antecedent is distinct and different from the consequent. Here already, therefore, multiplicity appears.

2. The World of Notions. Here begins the classification of the multiple; and thus multiplicity in unity — or harmony — begins to emerge.

3. The Mathematical World, where the distinguishing characteristic is continuity of number and motion. Here falls the concrete being of sensible appearance.

4. The Physical World. At this stage the continuity of the 'mathematical world' is split up into heterogeneity.

5. The Living World. Out of this heterogeneity is developed 'individuality,' which is the essence of the 'living world,' and which introduces harmony and organization into the heterogeneity of the 'physical world.' Here we find, for the first time distinctly, the principle of finality in operation.

6. The World of Thought, made up of conscious beings. "Finally, above life itself, and on the foundations it supplies, rises consciousness, where the world is felt, known, and dominated."¹⁷ The distinguishing characteristics of conscious beings are sensibility, intelligence, free will.

Each form of being is a preparation of the higher forms. All the lower grades of development are absorbed into the higher; likewise the higher are implicit in the lower.¹⁸ The resultant

¹⁶ *Hasard ou Liberté?* p. 146.

¹⁷ *Contingency of the Laws of Nature*, Rothwell's translation, p. 163.

¹⁸ Compare Aristotle's conception of the development of the $\psi\upsilon\chi\acute{\eta}$. Also Hegel takes essentially the same position, *Philosophy of Mind*, par. 380.

hierarchy is, therefore, a perfectly articulated, organic whole. Each tier of the hierarchy is in a sense conditioned by the preceding. On the other hand, each given world is to a certain degree independent of the lower orders. For with each advance toward the summit of the hierarchy there is a qualitative change, which implies finality. Finality transcends experience and therefore cannot be the index of physical necessity. At the final stage the conscious being has the added, all-important characteristic of '*une grande indépendance*', and looks upon material conditions rather as instruments than as bonds.

Furthermore, as we mount the ascending scale, necessity more and more gives place to 'finality', which latter term Boutroux defines as '*une sorte d'attrait pour certains buts*.' It is this '*attrait*' which guides, without determining, man's free will.

Between the beings of the Living World and of the Thinking World Boutroux makes a sharp and clear distinction. The principle of finality is at work in both cases. But in the one case the animal (member of the Living World) must perforce accept the end which is given ('*la fin donnée*'). For example, he must will to eat ants, not fruits, if he be a pangolin; or flesh, if he belong to the carnivorous species; and, above all, he must will to live. An animal cannot commit suicide.¹⁹ Man (the thinking being), on the other hand, is possessed of a soul, distinct at once from matter and from life. By virtue of his soul, or '*la raison libre*,' the human being is endowed with the power of choosing his own ends. In so far as he is a man, his ends are not given to him from without, by an external power. More than this, he may choose the means of accomplishing his self-appointed ends; he can, and does constantly, adapt natural phenomena (environment) to suit his special purposes — his needs or even his capricious desires.

True to his Leibnizian doctrine, Boutroux discovers that as we mount the ascending steps of the hierarchy, the beings on each succeeding level are guided more and more by the principle of finality, and are endowed with an ever greater spontaneity and freedom and reason. Finally, surmounting the whole, we must find the All-Perfect, the All-Free, the All-Powerful.

¹⁹ Compare Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, par. 47, Add.

Having carefully constructed his hierarchy of realities, Boutroux then rather naïvely posits a 'sous-sol,' which represents a realm of being lower than the World of Causes. The 'sous-sol,' however, proves to be a mere abstraction, a figment of man's imagination. If there were a world of purely inanimate objects, that would be the 'sous-sol,' a world of mere brute matter, dominated by pure physical necessity, characterized by quantity without quality. Such a condition is unthinkable; it would be 'identique au néant.' Even this hypothetical 'sous-sol' must have implicit within it at least a shadow of being, and must reserve some place for contingency, even though that place may be 'infiniment petite.'

Is it inevitable, then, that philosophy and science continue to be mutually exclusive, if not mutually antagonistic? Boutroux is convinced that for the highest development of each there must be some rapprochement. He is not prepared, however, to define the proper relations between these two great branches of human knowledge. The answer to this question cannot be simple or final.

It is the part of wisdom for present-day philosophy to keep more and more closely in touch with the sciences, with their history, development, and methods. He believes this is actually being done, to no little degree, by modern philosophic thinkers, and that this rapprochement is responsible, in some measure at least, for the renaissance of philosophy and for the present lively interest in philosophic problems.

The marvellous development of the sciences, indeed, has not merely revealed a mass of truths which must necessarily be taken into account; it has created a 'set' of the mind and a form of intelligence which henceforth belongs to us, and according to which we form our first judgments of the conceptions which are presented to us. Philosophy can subsist only by being in harmony with the way of thinking which science has decided upon.²⁰

It may be that science has no such need of philosophy; that scientific progress does not depend upon such intercourse; and that the scientist, though isolated and ignorant of philosophic

²⁰ 'Du Rapport de la Philosophie aux Sciences,' *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*, XIX, 4, 1911, pp. 417-435.

problems and vision, may yet achieve results in his chosen restricted field. Nevertheless, more and more, we hear of the "*philosophic* scientist"; for him the thinking world has more respect than for the "practical" or "mere" scientist. Boutroux maintains that it behooves the man of science likewise to keep himself en rapport with the progress of philosophic thought, if he wishes to realize his highest possibilities. Thus:

In a general way, the transition from science to philosophy is contingent. Aristotle said, ἀναγκαῖότεραι μὲν οὖν πᾶσαι αὐτῆς. But he adds, ἀμείνων δ' οὐδεμία. If thinking is not a necessity, it is a dignity. . . . There is a certain solidarity between science and philosophy in the eyes of a spirit which wishes not only to know but to understand and to form for itself an ideal. Philosophy is the work of reason, which makes use of science and of life to realize itself.

V

God is that being, of whose creative activity we are conscious deep within ourselves, in all our efforts to draw nearer to him. He is the one perfect and necessary being. . . . God is the creator of the essence and existence of beings. Moreover, it is His activity, His incessant providence, that gives the higher forms the faculty of employing the lower ones as instruments. . . . Is not God the supremely good and beautiful? And, if the beings of nature offer some analogy with Him, does He not appear as their ideal, and not simply as their creative cause? . . . Is it not in conformity with divine goodness to summon all beings, each according to its own dignity, to do that which is good, and also to instil in them that spontaneous activity which is the indispensable condition thereof?²¹

Upon his belief in God — a living, all-powerful, all-free, all-perfect God, Boutroux based his whole philosophy. It would be difficult to over-emphasize this aspect of his teaching. It will be necessary to present it largely in his own words. Equally difficult is it to reproduce adequately the importance which he himself attached to the religious life.

It is an activity of the soul, whether of the soul of an individual, or of those ever-widening collective souls which it is able, itself, to create through individual souls.²²

"Man doth not live by bread alone," nor can man be moved toward a higher life merely by ideas, however clear and dis-

²¹ Contingency of the Laws of Nature, Rothwell's translation, pp. 179, 180, 181.

²² Science and Religion in Contemporary Philosophy, Nield's translation, p. 388.

tingent they may be. Faith, an ideal, and enthusiasm — these are the three spirit-sources of human action; they represent the will, intellect, and feeling, transformed by the influence of religion. At the root of human life — in so far as it is truly human — we find religion. But

To rise to the creative principle of life is not a necessity. We can live by mere instinct, or by routine, or by imitation; we can live, perhaps, by the abstract intellect or by knowledge. Religion offers man a richer and deeper life than purely spontaneous or even intellectual life; she constitutes, so to speak, a synthesis — or, rather, a close and spiritual union — of instinct and intellect, in which each of the two, merged with the other, and, thereby, even transfigured and exalted, possesses a fullness and a creative power which separate action could not yield.²³

The maxim of religion is: You ought, therefore you can. Once a man has made this maxim his own, he has found true freedom of the spirit. No longer is he dwarfed by adherence to the dictates of physical nature, which measures obligation in terms of individual power. Another great lesson which religion has taught is the dignity of mankind and the value of the individual as an end in himself.²⁴ Thus the religious man honors humanity not only in himself but in all human beings. Religion has thus become universalized.

Dogmas are an integral element of all real religion, for they are founded not on what is, but on what ought to be — the very essence of all religious knowledge. The two fundamental dogmas are the existence of God — a living, perfect, all-powerful God — and the relationship, at once living and concrete, of God with man.

We seem to hear an echo of Pascal, when Boutroux declares:

All intense religious life is mystical; and mysticism is the life-source from which religions, threatened by a formal and scholastic spirit, derive fresh vigor. . . . But mysticism itself is subdivided into passive mysticism and active mysticism. The former is satisfied with retiring from the world and with contemplating God; the latter from the bosom of God, loves, wills, and shines. Now, in order to realize itself outwardly it must think and act.

²³ Ibid. p. 378.

²⁴ Compare Kant: "So act as to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of any other, in every case as an end withal, never as a means only" (*Metaphysic of Morals*, Abbott's translation, p. 47).

That is why the two elements of belief and practice, which, from earliest times, religion has added to feeling, are quite inseparable from it.²⁵

How can we explain the might of the religious spirit, incomprehensible and indefinable as it is?

Religion has united and divided men, she has made and unmade empires, she has occasioned terrible wars, she has opposed spirit as an insurmountable hindrance to material might. In the sphere of individual conscience she has raised contests as dramatic as the wars between nations. She has braved and subdued nature, she has made man happy in wretchedness, miserable in prosperity. Whence proceeds this strange sovereignty, if not from a faith stronger than knowledge; from a conviction that God is with us, more effectual than all human aid; from a love stronger than all arguments? ²⁶

²⁵ Science and Religion in Contemporary Philosophy, Nield's translation, pp. 397, 398.

²⁶ Ibid. p. 381.

BETWEEN JESUS AND THE GOSPELS

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A NEW and not unfruitful stage in the literary criticism of the gospels seems to be marked by the recent publication in Germany of three important books.¹ For nearly a century the Synoptic problem has absorbed the attention of scholars. The fascinating riddle of likeness and difference in our first three gospels challenged them to find a solution. It became clear that this was a question of written sources, and for many minds the "two-document hypothesis," that Mark and some other common written Greek material (Q) are embodied independently in Matthew and in Luke, has come to provide a working basis of investigation, although the categorical denial of this view by the Papal Biblical Commission makes it impossible for Roman Catholic scholars to accept it in its current form. There remain, however, the question of other Greek sources, as, for example, the sources for Mark's and for Luke's special material, and the question of the possibility of Semitic originals, on which no conclusion has been attained and on which perhaps more light may soon be expected from further studies.

The field of research which the more recent foreign study has been staking out lies behind these questions of written record. The writers in question all accept the prevailing solution of the relations between the gospels, and would probably acknowledge the possibility of written sources either Greek or Aramaic lying further back in the stream of history, but their main interest is in the still earlier development of the Synoptic material. This material has a history more varied and more extensive than we have sometimes realized. Even though the interval between Jesus and our records be only two or three

¹ M. Dibelius, *Die Formgeschichte des Evangeliums*, 1919; K. L. Schmidt, *Der Rahmen der Geschichte Jesu*, 1919; R. Bultmann, *Die Geschichte der synoptischen Tradition*, 1921. See also note at close of this article.

decades, the tradition of Jesus' deeds and words had passed through many changes. Things that to the eye-witnesses had been present had become past, and things to them future were now present. Not only in language but in point of view the Gospel had been translated from a Semitic to a Greek version. The memorabilia of Jesus had suffered successive processes of scattering and collecting, simplification and elaboration. The church had selected, adapted, and arranged this material to suit its manifold needs "for teaching, for reproof, for correction, for instruction which is in righteousness," for apologetic, for propaganda, for comfort and edification, and the church itself, even in those first few years, had gone through many changes and produced many "varieties of religious experience." The material in the gospels had been poured through many sieves and mixed in many crucibles. Some of it had been exposed to the influence of Jewish thought, some to Gentile; some to Jewish-Christian, some to Hellenistic-Christian coloring.

It is at least a negative merit of modern research that for the recovery of these interesting and obscure stages in the literary history of the gospels it is no longer the habit to spin a complete theory from those brief and baffling references which occur in the preface of Luke and in Eusebius's quotations from Papias. Far better examine the gospels themselves and compel them to divulge the secrets of their past. They are the products of their history, they contain, like geological strata, the marks and deposits of the developments that lie behind them. It is not easy to discover these processes, to "unscramble" this conglomerate. Much of our restoration of history must be conjectural; convincing proof and universal agreement need not be expected. But it is instructive to see how the task is defined and what methods are used, even when the results must remain tentative or contradictory.

Professor Martin Dibelius of Heidelberg seeks to recover the history of the material through a classification of it based on its probable uses in the church. The gospels, as we have them, are not due to the creative literary formulation of the writers, but to the collecting and editing of matter which had come

down to them in several characteristic forms. Most of the terms which Dibelius uses for these forms are not easily translatable into English, indeed some are not even German, as *Paradigmata*, *Novelle*, *Paränese*, *Mythus*. He lays great stress on the sermon (*Predigt*) as determining the form of the gospel material, especially the continuous narrative of the passion. Other early narrative material existed in smaller units, principally of two kinds, the *paradigma*, or edifying anecdote, the point of which is the remark of Jesus which concludes the story and gives it general application, and the *novelle*, or miracle story, which draws attention to Jesus as a wonder-worker. The words of Jesus were collected to provide definite Christian teaching — or *paränese*. This parenetic material is 'the gospel' in its original sense, Dibelius thinks, and he illustrates it by Q, by some sections in Mark, and by similar material in the early Christian epistles. Finally by *mythus* Dibelius means those deeds or words which are reported as from a divinity rather than as from a teacher.

Each of these literary types has some analogies in non-Christian literature, and the Christian examples were in some cases modified by borrowed motifs, but the material is, as a whole, much older than the collections into which the evangelists brought it — especially the *paradigmata* and the sayings of Jesus. Even the *novelle* is far more restrained than most miracle stories, revealing only a few of the conventional miracle motifs. The material is of very varying historical worth, and this is still the case when it is patched together into a continuous gospel like Mark. Its history is, however, a natural and spontaneous one, corresponding to the several and successive needs and customs of the Christian cultus.

Professor K. L. Schmidt of Giessen (formerly of Berlin) deals, not, like Dibelius, with the nuclear matter of each section in the gospels, but with the connective tissue. He sets as his task the detailed analysis of the references to time and place throughout the three Synoptic gospels. Here is the field where the later copyists of our manuscripts show greatest freedom in altering the text. Here the secondary evangelists, Matthew and Luke, make most changes in Mark, and here Mark himself

is most independent and arbitrary. The outline of events and the connective links are not so old or reliable as the scenes connected. Mark's material consisted of detached scenes, or at most brief complexes, of which the passion story is the longest and most certain. Mark strings them as beads, and the phrases with which he seems to bind them really indicate the limits of separate sections. "Strictly speaking, no framework, no outline, is present in Mark. Individual narratives are loosely arranged, one after another, while they stand sometimes with, sometimes without, notes of time and place."²

The order of Mark, therefore, does not seem to Schmidt to merit the confidence that of late scholars have been inclined to give it. In so far as Mark strives to suggest order, his work is artificial. The materials available to him were not capable of chronological and geographical arrangement, and he operates with them with the same editorial creativeness as does John. From the literary analysis it may be proved that Mark was written before Matthew and Luke, but this does not prove that his outline is superior to theirs. The changes of Matthew and Luke do not disturb a good chronology, they merely create a new and equally arbitrary one. Neither Luke (Spitta) nor Ur-Marcus (Wendling) provides a preferable arrangement, since no real chronology is available anywhere.³ "The historical and the literary treatment," complains Schmidt, "are altogether too much confused with one another in the labors of research. The representatives of the Mark-hypothesis have the correct literary perception that Mark is the oldest gospel, and they draw from this the false historical conclusion that this gospel has in every respect historical worth superior to that of the other gospels. Other scholars, like Spitta, have the correct historical perception that Mark has not this historical worth, and draw from this the false literary conclusion that his gospel is not the oldest."⁴

Professor Bultmann, who was Schmidt's predecessor at Giessen but has recently been called to Marburg, undertakes to deal more comprehensively with the whole "history of the

² Schmidt, *op. cit.*, p. 90.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 17.

³ Schmidt, *op. cit.*, pp. 76 f.

Synoptic tradition." His classification is somewhat clearer than that of Dibelius, distinguishing first between sayings of Jesus and narrative material, and further between sub-divisions of each main group. But mere classification is not his aim. Under each heading, and indeed for each unit of the gospel material, he tries to discover the origin, the influences, and the editorial treatment. He then considers the principles at work in the collecting and arranging of the material, and describes the particular editorial method of each of the evangelists. Like Dibelius he recognizes as a primitive form the narrative incident which has its point in a concluding remark of Jesus, though he calls it *apothegma* rather than *paradigma*. He too distinguishes the miracle story, though the development of tradition tended to make these two classes approximate each other. Of special interest is his discussion of the relation in literary form and device of the gospel material to the Jewish didactic literature and to the gentile tales of miracles. But his work is one of great detail, like Schmidt's a masterpiece of "Kleinarbeit," into which one can enter only by a careful study of his German book and a Greek harmony of the gospels.

It is not likely that many readers of this article will follow this thorough method; perhaps it is not desirable that they should do so. They would not agree with all the positions advocated, nor would they find all decisions on minor questions convincing. But such fresh study of the early history of the material ultimately embodied in our gospels has certain effects upon our attitude towards the understanding of the gospels which are generally sound and are most significant.

It is important first of all to recognize that the gospel matter has a history. It is too easy to forget that history does not write itself, like the recording thermometer, without any human intervention. Even eyewitnesses must exercise a considerable selective and editorial function if they are to record contemporary facts, while each later stage of transmission increases the complexity of the process. In the case of the gospels the material was subjected to a rapid series of varied developments. The task of the evangelist was not merely that of a scribe: he had to select and arrange material from the most diverse

sources. We are often inclined to judge the gospels by the standards of biography proper, but we do well to recall that in their earlier history the *disjecta membra* of which the gospels were composed were even less biographical in form than they are now. The interest of the evangelists was not primarily historical, but still less historical were the motives which led to the earlier circulation and use of the evangelic material.

Whether the processes which immediately preceded the writing of our gospels were oral or written is a question of little moment. So unstudied were the written processes at that stage that they are scarcely distinguishable from oral ones. The editorial methods revealed by a comparison of Mark with his successors constitute a valuable hint as to what had been going on through preceding stages of gestation, and it is well to forsake for a time the natural interest in written records in order to study the transformations incident to both written and unwritten transmission. Synoptic study has been excavating the upper strata; we need now to dig down into the older archaeological layers underneath.

The recognition of the previous independence of the sayings and incidents now collected in our gospels suggests that little emphasis can be laid upon the present order or arrangement. How unwarranted is the reliance often placed upon the order of Mark, Schmidt has correctly and finally shown. This is also the judgment of Bultmann,⁵ and it must be that of all who have seriously considered the character of the connective tissue in Mark and in the other evangelists. Those connecting phrases, "and," "and again," "and immediately," "and he went forth," and the like, are conventional links, necessary when scattered narratives are to be collected in a series. They represent not original sequence but rather editorial caesuras. Possibly even the passion story, the most closely knit of any considerable narrative complex, is also an illustration of agglutinative processes.⁶ Several of the incidents related in diary form at the close of Mark must have existed earlier without

⁵ Op. cit., p. 213.

⁶ This is Bultmann's view, pp. 158-173, as distinct from the views of Schmidt and Dibelius noted above.

this connection, such as the anointing of Jesus (Luke 7), the cleansing of the temple (John 2), and the last supper (1 Cor. 11). The reasons other than chronological for the order of Mark are sometimes observable in the topical connections manifest when sabbath controversies, or parables, or test questions, or predictive sayings are assembled in special sections. If there is any scheme in the gospel, any development or progression, it is Mark's, and not a residue of a primitive tradition. Tradition provided a great variety of memorabilia, but not the framework for setting them into a narrative. It is strange that so many who trust the early testimony of Papias as to the author (Mark) and the authority (Peter) for the second gospel feel free to neglect Papias's explicit statement that the things said and done are not recorded in order.

Among the latest elements in the tradition are also the summaries of Jesus' work. They mark a typical phase of the process of collection, in cases where biographies are created out of anecdotes. They must be set to the account of the evangelists or of their immediate predecessors, being distilled from the individual incidents. The summaries found in Mark the later evangelists used two or three times over, and thus at once they indicate the usefulness of this material as giving marks of transition and connection, and reveal the freedom with which it is employed.

The order of the sayings of Jesus is as arbitrary as the order of the incidents. These too, like the individual miracle stories or anecdotes, had become detached, complete and independent units, and when the exigencies of collective use, whether in collections of sayings (Q), oral or written, or in association with narratives, required that they receive fixed positions, the natural laws of association largely determined their sequence. Already in Mark we see the agglutinative principle, so extensively at work throughout the gospels, of succession by catchwords.⁷ The principle is the psychological principle of

⁷ For instance, Mark 9, 35-50. See the interesting distinction of Augustine, quoted by Schmidt, p. 9, between the *ordo rerum gestarum* and the *ordo recordationis*. The fullest examination of the principle of memory by suggestion—*Stichwortdisposition* is the convenient German compound name for it—in the gospels is by a Catholic

memory by suggestion. Thus whole series of pithy sayings of Jesus are collected by the evangelists or their predecessors into long combinations, or an erratic boulder gets dropped into a convenient though arbitrary connection. Sometimes the arrangement succeeds in securing topical unity, but this is no assurance of the primitive setting or meaning of the sayings thus arranged and interpreted. As in the narrative material so here, the new suture is often revealed by the disjunctive "and he said," "verily I say unto you," and the like. It is to be regretted that the original setting of so many of Jesus' words has been lost, and with it much that might have elucidated their meaning, but it would be foolish to bewail that loss overmuch or to try to gloze it over by treating the present position of the *logia* in the gospels as if it were a guide to their original setting and meaning.

The conjunction of narratives with sayings, illustrated on the large scale in Mark and by the interweaving of Mark and Q, also took place within single sections. If the anecdote ending in a striking word of Jesus was a primitive form of memorabilia, it provided a model for further formations. Anecdotes were supplemented with additional sayings, and sayings were provided with appropriate narrative settings. The latter process is still at work in Luke, the former one is sometimes seen in Matthew, and may be suspected behind some passages of Mark.

The recognition of the previous independence and completeness of the narratives now embedded in the gospels raises at once a question as to the trustworthiness of the references to places as well as to time. The stories rarely require any particular setting beyond that which the events suggest — a fisherman will be by the sea, a publican at his place of toll. Sometimes the evangelist simply deduced these circumstances from the incident itself and included them in his editorial introduction; at other times the indications of place are vague or con-

scholar (Thaddaeus Soiron, *Die Logia Jesu*, 1916), a fact which shows that in the realms that lie outside of the forbidden land of the two-document hypothesis Protestants will find among Roman Catholics welcome co-workers in retracing the growth of the gospels.

ventional. But what about the proper names of places? Are these to be regarded as unnecessary details whose very unnecessaryness assures us of their accuracy? or are they embellishments due to the later stages of tradition? Tendencies were at work in the transmission of the material which would justify either answer to this question.

Similar is the case with the names of persons. It is obvious that later tradition often supplied names to actors who in earlier stages of tradition were anonymous, such as Veronica, Malchus, Petronius, and the magi from the East. On the other hand, such unnecessary details frequently disappear under the polishing process of retelling a tale. At first sight it seems extreme skepticism when Bultmann suggests that in the healing stories the names of those cured by Jesus were not an original element of the *genre*; yet the Synoptic gospels as they stand almost permit that view, and to accept it we should have to sacrifice from Mark only two names and those both patronymics — Bar-Timaeus and the daughter of Jairus.⁸

Still another phase of the conflicting currents at work is due to the later tendency of the church to divide the gospels into independent pericopes for church use. This is particularly evident in the actual textual history of the gospels, and perhaps goes back still earlier, but it is precisely the reverse of the procedure of collection and connection carried on by the editors of floating traditions. While Mark's interest, and still more that of Luke, was to make a continuous narrative, the custom of church lections led to the isolation of complete sections with appropriate introductions to each.

These opposite tendencies of tradition are, however, only contrasts of literary method. Still more interesting is the illumination as to contrasts of general point of view and atmosphere which a study of the history of the gospel material provides. If this material has passed through the biological history, and been subjected to such varied use and influence as we have suggested above, we are prepared to find in our present

⁸ It is possible that even the name Jairus did not originally stand in Mark 5, 22, but was first introduced by Luke and came thence into most of the Mss. of Mark. It is not found in D a e f f i in the Markan passage, and does not appear in Matthew.

gospels evidences of this complicated inheritance. Discrepancy and inconcinnity in the gospels are not faults, but are the inherited traits from a varied ancestry. It is not necessary to explain such discrepancies by theories of written sources. Nor do they discredit the accuracy of the whole account. Strauss once compared the Fourth Gospel to Christ's seamless robe; one may cast lots for it, one may not divide it. But such a dilemma is not presented by any of the gospels, not even John. They are patchwork quilts, coats of many colors. They need not be dealt with as indivisible wholes. To be sure, in a certain sense, they are units and should be so studied. Many of the characteristics of Mark both in motif and in scheme are the consistent work of the author. Matthew and Luke have each left a distinctive personal imprint upon the material; but the material still retains clear traces of its underlying variety.

Who can deny the presence of many strands in the gospels that we have? Even John is a strange mixture of the Palestinian and the Hellenic, of the primitive and the late, of reality and symbol, of fact and interpretation, of theology and experience. The contrasts and contradictions which a single Synoptic evangelist like Matthew preserved in his own recension of the material is a guarantee that at least in this stage there has been no perversion due to a redactor's thoroughgoing consistency. He is capable of combining sayings of legalistic tendency with the strongest anti-legal polemic, of both emphasizing and ignoring primitive apocalyptic. He is found presenting in juxtaposition what is legendary and what is trustworthy. In view of the complex nature of the tradition there is nothing remarkable in his tracing the Davidic descent of Joseph and immediately thereafter insisting that Joseph was not Jesus' father. Nor should the resurrection narratives with their alternation between physical and non-material traits surprise us. All these things show how faithfully have been preserved the successive and divergent phases of gospel tradition.

Above all a knowledge of this polychrome history gives us an escape from radical skepticism about the origin of Christianity as well as a sufficient answer to modern efforts to trace the

whole story of Christ to a single outside origin. We can acknowledge the presence of mythic influences in spots without accepting a mythic origin for the whole. We can see the occasional effect of the Old Testament without having recourse to this panacea as the cure of all difficulties. We can even acknowledge that in some cases popular legends of Egyptian or oriental origin may have contaminated the stream of tradition as it flowed through the syncretistic atmosphere of the Hellenistic world, but we need not ourselves plunge into monomaniac Panbabylonianism. It is possible that the large Jewish element in Jesus' original words has been occasionally reinforced by similar accretions from rabbinic dicta. Even to the Christian factor in the tradition, in distinction from the primitive mind of Jesus and the unembellished facts of his career, we may allow a large and even preponderant influence in our gospels. We are not thereby forced to conclude that the church invented the nucleus itself.

Thus while a study of the origin of the gospels serves to dissipate that greatest of all myths — the myth of a simon-pure tradition, it assures us that in believing in the historicity of Jesus we are not following cunningly devised fables. In spite of almost protean changes in the history of tradition, no suspicion arises of deliberate fiction, least of all on the part of the evangelists themselves. If they are not primitive in all their points of view, it is because the material that came to them was no longer primitive. Like all ancient writers they were largely at the mercy of their sources. Nor was deliberate falsification a motive in the preceding stages. We need not doubt that Jesus was born, lived, and died. Perhaps Old Testament motifs influenced the traditions of Jesus' death, probably both alien and Jewish influences affected the story of his birth; but such influences were unconscious and gradual, and so subtly intergrown with one another and with the older material as to defy exact demarcation. But the impossibility of obtaining exact results in details need not hide from our eyes the general probability of such a prehistoric story of the gospel tradition as has been brought to our attention.

Studies undertaken out of a singleminded effort for analysis by literary criticism may lead in the end to important historical results. The surpassing interest of the field in which this literary excavation is being carried on should tempt many more workmen of all lands and creeds to join in the search and should rouse the sympathetic attention of those who perforce remain only spectators.⁹

⁹ For the sake of completeness mention should be made of two monographs on special phases of gospel "Formgeschichte" which came to hand after this article was in type: M. Albertz, *Die synoptischen Streitgespräche; ein Beitrag zur Formgeschichte des Urchristentums*, 1921; G. Bertram, *Die Leidensgeschichte Jesu und der Christuskult; eine formgeschichtliche Untersuchung*, 1922.

A JEWISH LIFE OF JESUS

GEORGE FOOT MOORE

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JESUS OF NAZARETH. HIS TIMES, HIS LIFE, AND HIS TEACHINGS.

BY JOSEPH KLAUSNER, JERUSALEM, 1922.¹

THE author of this Life of Jesus is a well-known scholar, who has written much, especially in Hebrew periodicals such as "Ha-Shiloh," of which he became editor in 1903. To Christian scholars he is best known by "Die Messianischen Vorstellungen des jüdischen Volkes im Zeitalter der Tannaiten" (Berlin, 1904), a work distinguished to its advantage from the ordinary literature on the subject by the limitation of its field to a definite period, the first two centuries of the Christian era, and to sources recognized as authoritative. In that volume he showed himself amply acquainted with the modern Christian literature on Jewish messianic beliefs and expectations. In his Life of Jesus the same familiarity with New Testament criticism and discussion, down to the most recent, and with writings that deal at large or incidentally with the life and teaching of Jesus, appears on every page. It is, as he says, the first time that a Jewish scholar, writing in Hebrew and primarily for Jewish readers, has attempted to present the life of Jesus in the light of historical criticism and with the methods of the modern historian; previous lives of Jesus in Hebrew having been written either for the purpose of converting Jews to Christianity or of combating this propaganda.

At the outset Klausner observes that the historian is confronted by the problem, why it was that, though Jesus was born and brought up in Judaism and lived and died as a Jew of his time, the majority of his disciples, even in the first generation, and still more largely in that which followed, were not Jews, while the great mass of his people then and in all succeeding ages rejected not only the divinity ascribed to him by the

¹ יֵשׁוּ הַנֹּצֵרִי. זְמַנּוֹ, חַיּוֹ וְתוֹרָתוֹ. מֵאֵת ד"ר יוֹסֵף קְלָאוֹנֶר. יְרוּשָׁלַם, תרפ"ב.

Christian church from its beginning, but the Messianic mission which his immediate Jewish disciples asserted for him, and which indeed in the latter part of his career he claimed for himself. Many scholars, both Jews and Christians, account for this by the fact that, from Paul on, ideas of heathen (Greek) origin were introduced into Christianity, which speedily almost choked out the fundamental Jewish elements which alone were known to Jesus. This explanation seems to the author inadequate: if there had not been in the teaching of Jesus himself elements conflicting with the Israelite "Weltanschauung," it would have been impossible for a new religion to spring from it in which the spirit of Judaism could not acquiesce. Whatever the intention of Jesus may have been, there must have been in his teaching germs from which a non-Jewish, and even an anti-Jewish, religion, not only could, but necessarily did, develop. Throughout the volume therefore the author has his eyes open for the differences between the teaching and influence of Jesus and the Judaism of his age and surroundings; and in the chapter on the teaching of Jesus which concludes the work he brings these observations to a focus.

The teaching of Jesus was essentially Jewish; parallels to almost every particular of it can be adduced from utterances of the acknowledged teachers of Judaism in the first and second centuries of the Christian era. But in its predominantly and almost exclusively ethical character, it represents but one side of Judaism. Jesus acknowledges, indeed, the obligations of the religious law and the authority of the Scribes and Pharisees as its interpreters, but himself makes little account of man's religious duties, and particularly of the observances of religion which fill so large a space in the Scriptures. The moral principles and precepts upon which Jesus lays the whole emphasis, although Jewish, are not specifically Jewish; they are in their nature individual and universal. Jesus did not perceive that religious morals, in distinction from philosophical ethics, must be based upon the religion of a people, a nation, and are inseparable from the distinctive observances of that religion.

Further, the precepts of Jesus for individual conduct are frequently incompatible with the existence of an organized and

lawful society. If, for example, everybody were to follow the rule of turning his left cheek to the man who struck him on the right, or of letting the robber who took his cloak have his coat also, society would be impossible. Such exaggerations are explicable by Jesus' belief that a great crisis was imminent in which the present order of society was to be superseded by a supernatural order in the "Reign of God" — the moral teaching of Jesus is in fact what has been called an "interim ethic." These considerations explain why the teaching of Jesus made no impression on Jews either in his own generation or later. Apart from its exaggerated idealism it was all familiar; but it was only an isolated part of what in Judaism was an organic whole.

The author has a high appreciation of the moral teaching of Jesus, both in content and form. The closing sentence of the book is: "If the day should ever come when this ethic detaches itself from the mystical faith and the miraculous narratives by which it is enveloped, the ethical teaching of Jesus will be one of the most precious pearls in the literature of Israel in all ages."

It is an obvious criticism that the author unduly narrows his problem when he makes it the main question why the Jews did not recognize Jesus as the great moral teacher that Klausner himself sees in him. It was not as a moral teacher that Jesus sought the recognition of his people, not as a moral teacher that his disciples demanded faith in him as the Messiah. The death of Jesus doubtless seemed to most of his countrymen the complete refutation of such claims, and the assertion of his disciples that they had seen him, come to life again and taken up to heaven, whence he would presently reappear to judgment, was received with natural incredulity. Nor was it as a moral teacher that the Apostles preached Jesus to the Gentiles, but as a Son of God, a divine Lord and Saviour — a conception even more repugnant to Jews than a crucified Messiah. Klausner does not fail to note these things, but he attaches to them much less than their due importance in accounting for the prevailing attitude of Jews to Christianity. Above all he does not make enough of the fact that Christianity, in passing to the Gentiles, became a new religion. It was not, like the Palestinian "dis-

ciples of Jesus of Nazareth," a messianic heresy in Judaism, otherwise orthodox and observant, but a redemptive religion of a type common in the Hellenistic world of the times, and wholly incompatible with Judaism, as both sides promptly recognized. It was the soteriology of Christianity, even more than its antinomianism, that made it in the eyes of Jews a false religion. Not even the germs of this development into "a non-Jewish and even anti-Jewish religion" are to be sought in the limitations or defects of the ethics of Jesus.

The author begins by mustering the various sources for the life and teaching of Jesus, taking first the passages in the Talmuds and Midrashim which mention Jesus or have been thought to refer to him. The outcome of the critical investigation of these texts is that they yield nothing of independent historical value for the life of Jesus, though they throw light on the relations between the leaders of Jewry and his followers in the two or three generations after the destruction of Jerusalem. After a short chapter on the mediaeval "Toledot Jeshu" in its several forms, its character and sources, the author deals briefly, but sufficiently, with Josephus, the references in Roman writers, Paul and early Christian writers, the apocryphal gospels.

The survey shows that the canonical Gospels, more exactly the first three, remain substantially the sole original source for the life and teaching of Jesus. To the history of the criticism of the Gospels and of the representations of the character and work of Jesus, Klausner devotes a chapter (pp. 69-118) remarkable for comprehensiveness and for the skill with which, in brief compass, the salient characteristics of the several works are set forth. This chapter is supplemented by an appendix to the volume (pp. 451-466) on the criticism of the first two decades of the present century. No such conspectus of the Christian literature on the subject has ever been laid before Jewish scholars; and however much the author has profited by predecessors like Schweitzer, the point of view is distinctive and instructive. Nor will the Christian scholar find anywhere a comparable survey of the Jewish literature, which is, indeed, generally ignored. In his own use of the Gospels, Klausner operates with the two-source theory of modern critics, but

with less attention to questions of literary analysis and composition than to the credibility or verisimilitude of the report.

The second part of the book treats of the times — the political situation of the Jewish people in Palestine, the economic conditions, and their religious and moral life, observing especially those features which help to explain the appearance of Jesus, the following he gained in Galilee, the antagonism of the religious leaders, and his eventual fate. The presentation of the religious and moral life deserves special notice. It deals with education, elementary and advanced, its instrumentalities and extent; acquaintance with Greek science; the status of woman as a criterion of civilization; the irreligious elements in the upper and lower classes; the prevailing idea of God and the mediation of his will in the world; angels and demons; providence; retribution after death; messianic beliefs and expectations in different circles; sects and parties — Zealots, Essenes, Pharisees, Sadducees; the differences between the Pharisees and the Sadducees; Hillel and his teaching; Hillel and Jesus; the currents of popular Judaism as represented in the apocryphal writings.

Coming now to the life of Jesus itself, it may be noted that in a previous chapter Klausner emphatically rejects the mythical theories of earlier and later writers, down to Smith and Drews. He was called "the Nazarene" from the Galilean town of Nazareth, the name of which, though found in neither the Bible, Josephus, nor the Talmud, appears in a poem of Eleazar ha-Kalir based on an older Midrash. That Jesus was a Jew by birth as well as by education and religion is maintained against Kaminka, who would absolve his race of responsibility for Christianity, as well as against Haupt and Chamberlain, who would deprive it of the glory of giving birth to its founder. The following chapters deal with John the Baptist; the baptism of Jesus and the narratives of the temptation; the first appearance of Jesus in Galilee; the beginning of his work; the assumption of the rôle of Messiah; the days in Jerusalem; the trial and crucifixion of Jesus; concluding with a detailed exposition of his teaching in its agreement with that of the rabbis and its departures from them.

Klausner believes that the preaching of John, proclaiming the imminent advent of the Kingdom of Heaven (understood in the messianic sense) planted in the mind of Jesus the suggestion that he himself was the instrument in the hand of God for the inauguration of the Kingdom. The suggestion ripened into a conviction, which as time passed became a ruling idea; but he gave no publicity to this belief, nor did he communicate it even to his most intimate disciples — it was his “messianic secret” — so that the recognition by Peter at Caesarea Philippi was the first explicit definition of his mission. Even then he enjoined his disciples to keep the knowledge to themselves. It was, however, to show himself openly to his people in this character that he at last went up to Jerusalem, not without a presentiment of the reception he might meet in the stronghold of his adversaries.

In the account of the events in Jerusalem, Klausner discusses the question on what day Jesus ate the Passover with his disciples, a point on which the Synoptics and John disagree, and finds the latter supported by a baraita in Sanhedrin 4a, according to which Jesus was executed on the day before the Passover and, as a Florentine manuscript adds, on a Friday. In this, and in his explanation of how Jesus and his disciples kept the Passover twenty-four hours before its time, Klausner follows Chwolson. Why, in a story which otherwise has not the smallest verisimilitude in any particular, any greater authority should be attributed to the date, and particularly to its expanded form, neither of these authors has shown; nor has Chwolson’s finespun theory become any more plausible in Klausner’s reproduction.

The trial of Jesus before the Sanhedrin, and especially the account of the night session in Mark and Matthew, is full of difficulties, which have given occasion to a voluminous literature. What they narrate has no resemblance to the procedure laid down in the Mishnah Sanhedrin and other authorities. It has been said that that procedure was defined in the schools at a time when the high court had long ceased to exist, and in accordance with Pharisaic ideals rather than with ancient practice; and that, even if it had already been framed, the

court that sat in Jesus' case, composed as it was for the prevalent part of the Sadducean aristocracy of the priesthood, ignored it. The simplest hypothesis would seem to be that the tradition recorded in Mark converted into a formal session of the Sanhedrin what was in fact a conclave of certain members of that body hastily summoned by the high priest in the night to determine the charges they should present to the government (into whose keeping they were desirous of getting their prisoner at the earliest possible hour in the morning), and the grounds on which they should support them. Klausner regards the trial as a preliminary inquest; and is led by the evidence from Egyptian papyri adduced by Husband ("The Prosecution of Jesus," Princeton, 1916) to the conclusion that the Roman administration ordinarily committed such inquests to the local native authorities, and acted on their findings. He holds, with Husband, that the trial before the Sanhedrin as well as that in Pilate's forum, was entirely regular in the light of contemporary Roman practice. This is not the place to discuss this theory; but it is a witness to the range of Klausner's reading that it includes so recent an American book.

The chapters on the teaching of Jesus (pp. 395-448) are the part of the work in which Christian scholars would find the greatest intrinsic interest. After some general observations they discuss the Judaism of Jesus; differences between Judaism and his teaching; his idea of God; his moral teaching; the day of judgment and the Kingdom of Heaven (the messianic age) in the teaching of Jesus; the personality of Jesus and the secret of his influence; what is Jesus to modern Jews? Unfortunately a work written in Hebrew is a sealed book to most Christian readers. A translation of this part of the volume at least would be well worth while.

While I am upon this subject, I may add that Klausner has long been an advocate of a complete modernization of Hebrew, and exemplifies his principles in his writings. This is obviously the only way. If you want to express "Weltanschauung" or "Gesichtspunkt" or "Vorurteil" in Hebrew, you must put in some kind of juxtaposition Hebrew words, old or new, which convey the idea to the reader or suggest the German word,

whether the genius of a Semitic language tolerates such pseudo-compounds or not. They will become an accepted part of the vocabulary, and will eventually be justified by the final criterion, the *usus loquendi*.

In the last sentences of his preface Klausner expects that his work will be controverted by many Jews as well as Christians. For the Jewish side at least this presentiment was quickly verified. In the Hebrew monthly "Hatoren," published in New York (August, 1922, pp. 59-77), Armand Kaminka, a well-known scholar, subjects the book to a very severe criticism.² Klausner's enthusiastic nationalism led him to condone the forcible Judaizing of the regions conquered and annexed by John Hyrcanus, Aristobulus, and Alexander Jannaeus, to whom, he thinks, injustice has uniformly been done by historians, "more interested in civilization than in nationality." The policy of those princes in this respect cannot be morally justified; but how otherwise could the Jews make their position secure outside of Judaea and establish a considerable kingdom? To which Kaminka replies that the same kind of argument might be used for the forced conversion of Jews in Spain to Islam by the Almohades or to Christianity by the Inquisition, or for the measures of the Tsars Nicolas I and Alexander. The author evidently feels that such doctrine is dangerous in another direction. The Jews would make a fatal mistake if in their new national aspirations they should try to attain their end by material force, and especially by subjugating other peoples and trampling them under foot. The Jews are not like other nations; their reliance is on the supremacy of spiritual forces; the ultimate question — to be or not to be — is "whether the Lord is in the midst of us or not."

Kaminka's criticism in particulars is incisive and frequently well founded, as for instance his refutation of Chwolson's theory of the anticipated Passover, or on the influence of Herod's commercial policy on the character of the Jewish people. His main attack, however, is upon Klausner's whole representation and estimate of Jesus, in which he sees an un-

² תורת חכמי ישראל והאגדה הנוצרית.

becoming disposition to truckle to Christianity. As has been incidentally noted above, Kaminka in his "Studien zur Geschichte Galiläas" (1889) maintained that Jesus was not of Jewish parentage; in the present article he reaffirms this position, and complains that Chamberlain, Haupt, and others have stolen the idea from him. Furthermore, the Gospels, on which Klausner bases his entire representation, are legendary from beginning to end, and it is futile to try to extract from them either the events of Jesus' life or the substance of his teaching. To subtract from these narratives the supernatural in the person and work of Jesus, after the manner of Strauss and Baur and Renan, to bring down the "Son of Man" from the clouds of heaven, to strip him of the vestment of divinity, and represent him as a scholar and a scribe, a great ethical teacher, and one who turned the many to righteousness; to make him a rabbi and exalt him above the prophets, as Klausner does in their train, is to adopt the point of view of rationalistic Christians against the evidence, positive and negative, of the Hebrew sources. Kaminka is particularly incensed that Klausner represents Jesus as a figure of note in his generation, a rabbi—"a Pharisaean *rab*"—thoroughly at home in the Scriptures, a popular haggadist, and a moralist by the side of whom it is sufficient to say of Hillel that "in his ethics he attains an elevation not inferior to that of Jesus"; and by the comparison of Jesus' harsh strictures on the Pharisees with the invectives of Jeremiah against the priests of his day.

Such a conception of the reputation and influence of Jesus is energetically combated. The argument to which Klausner frequently reverts, that unless such a character and influence be assumed it is impossible to account for the fact that Christianity became the religion of millions of men, is effectively refuted: it was the Christianity of the Apostles, with its divine Christ and its miraculous narratives of his birth and of his resurrection, that had this success in the pagan world, to which such ideas were congenial. Moreover, in making Jesus a "Galilean *rab* and preacher" Klausner falls into a grave anachronism: Galilee was not a seat of rabbinic learning till the removal of the schools to Usha, Tiberias, and Sepphoris after the Bar Cocheba

war, and Galilean scholars appear in any numbers only in the generation of the patriarch Judah and later. Kaminka in fact contradicts Klausner's whole representation of Galilean Jewry — except its "hysterical temperament," on which he does not touch. Into the particulars of this polemic it is impossible to follow him here.

In conclusion he dwells on two errors in Klausner's *apologia* for the foundation of Christianity and the Gospels, as in Montefiore before him — who, however, got most of his learning from Christian scholars. The first is that the method of Jesus' teaching differed radically from that of the scribes: his was simple and direct, illustrated by parables, and therefore on a level with the understanding of the people and effective with them, while theirs was based on a formal interpretation of the Scriptures and proof-texts from the Law. Kaminka adduces to the contrary the example of Johanan ben Zakkai, and maintains, as he had done years ago, that the method of hermeneutic Midrash began to gain the ascendancy only with Hillel, and reached its culmination in Akiba; it was not the prevalent mode among the contemporaries of Jesus.

The second error of Christian critics, followed in this also by Montefiore and Klausner, is that the Gospels are purely ethical writings of remarkable elevation, all the more noteworthy as proceeding from a single man, who put his stamp on the whole, in contrast to the Talmud, in which "the ethical is scattered and mixed among ceremonial commandments and insignificant matters." The Gospels are far from being merely a compendium of ethics; and even considered in that light, the Jew, who had the precepts and examples of the Law and the Prophets and the Writings, above all the Book of Psalms, had no need of such a handbook. If the time came when such a thing was necessary, a man like Bahya ben Pakuda, the author of the "Duties of the Inner Man," arose to meet the need. Jesus was not capable of such a thing — "a man who, instead of sitting in the dust at the feet of the learned in Israel to learn from them the ways of life, made himself the head of a little community of ignorant men." How could there come from him a

new ethics, or, indeed, anything that was not found in the teaching of the learned?

Kaminka apologizes to the possible Christian reader for the vehemence of his language; it is meant not for sincere believers in Christianity, but for the Hebrew authors of such books as he is reviewing. To their righteous forefathers, ardent Hebrews, devoted with heart and soul to the worship of the One God, creator of heaven and earth, Jesus was known only as one who scoffed at the words of the learned, "a seducer and perverter," who hated the nation of Israel, and sought the destruction of the people. For the modern Jew to make any use of his moral utterances, it would be necessary first to blot out the heathenish cruelties and the Christian assumption of superiority — and even then one page of the *Hobot ha-Lebabot* would be more precious to an Israelite than this whole foreign possession, of which he has no need at all.

I have given so much space to Kaminka's article, which is not likely to fall under the eyes of many readers of this Review, because it is written from a point of view diametrically opposite to Klausner's. The contrast is instructive; it is a phase of the conflict between Modernism and Tradition in Judaism. As I have already said, Kaminka's criticisms are frequently sound; and if the polemic is bitter and sometimes descends to invective, we may be reminded that the Jews have small reason to admire Christian ethics in application, whether ecclesiastical, political, social, or individual; and, judging the tree by the fruit it has borne in eighteen centuries of persecution, they not unnaturally resent Christian assertions of its pre-eminence, and still more even the qualified admission of such claims by a Jew.

RECENT BOOKS ON JUDAISM

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BAECK'S "Wesen des Judentums"¹ first appeared in 1905, in the notable series issued by the Gesellschaft zur Förderung der Wissenschaft des Judentums, a modest brochure of 167 pages. In the new edition it has grown to nearly double its original size. The conception of the task, general plan of the work, and method of treatment remain unchanged; but within this framework it is largely a new book. Especially the second part, on the Ideas of Judaism, has been completely rewritten and greatly expanded, giving evidence throughout of recurrent occupation with the subject and maturing reflection. The book is written primarily for Jewish readers, but I know of no book to which any one who seriously wants to know what Judaism is to those who know it best can more confidently be sent for an answer. The author gives neither a history nor a theology — still less an apology — but an exposition and an appreciation of the character of the religion, and of its constitutive ideas, under the heads, Faith in God, and Faith in Men (ourselves, others, mankind as a whole), concluding with a chapter on the Maintenance of Judaism. The treatment is marked by philosophic breadth and insight, combined with a fine art of presentation. One whose calling requires him to read many books, and who has suffered more than his due from authors who seem to think that their reputation or the importance of their matter licenses them to write in a prose that neither gods, men, nor publishers ought to tolerate, may be pardoned for emphasizing his appreciation of a volume which he has read not only with profit but with delight.

In an article in the REVIEW for July 1921 (pages 216–221) I gave some account of the collections from the Talmud and

¹ Das Wesen des Judentums. Von Leo Baeck. Zweite, neu bearbeitete Auflage. Frankfurt a. M.: J. Kauffmann Verlag.

Midrash made by Christian scholars for the illustration of the New Testament — Cartwright, Lightfoot, Schoettgen, and the studies brought together by Meuschen. In more recent times it is sufficient to name Wünsche. All of these were sporadic annotations, drawn from a limited range of sources and frequently without sufficient criticism. New Testament commentators have hitherto had to depend upon these books, and upon the quotations for a wholly different purpose in Weber and similar writers. No attempt has hitherto been made to make a comprehensive, not to say exhaustive, collection of parallels and illustrations from the rabbinical sources.

This lack is now supplied by the "Kommentar zum Neuen Testament aus Talmud und Midrasch," by Strack and Billerbeck, of which the first volume (the Gospel of Matthew) has just appeared.² No Christian scholar of the generation just passing was so well equipped as Strack for such a task, and in Billerbeck, with whom he has been engaged upon it for sixteen years, he found a most competent associate. The work is planned on a very large scale: the volume before us contains 1055 large pages, most of it (the extracts themselves) in small but very legible type. The second volume will include Mark, Luke, John, and Acts; the third, the Epistles and the Revelation; while the fourth volume will be devoted to essays and excursuses on topics of New Testament theology and archaeology which require more extensive treatment than could be given in the commentary. The other volumes will naturally not be nearly so expansive as that on Matthew, the editors having rightly brought together in the first volume all that is relevant to the common matter of the Synoptic Gospels. Abundant cross references are provided, and frequent anticipatory references to the volume of special studies.

Professor Strack died on October 5, 1922, in his seventy-fourth year, just as the last sheets of this volume came off the press. The material for the succeeding volumes of the com-

² Kommentar zum Neuen Testament aus Talmud und Midrasch. Von Hermann Strack und Paul Billerbeck, Erster (Doppel-) Band. Das Evangelium nach Matthäus. München: C. H. Beck'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung. 1922. (viii + 1055 pp.)

mentary is all in Billerbeck's hands, and it is to be hoped that the work may be speedily carried to completion.

The very difficult problem of arranging so vast and varied a body of extracts has been successfully solved, and the typographical scheme is well-considered for the convenience of those who wish to consult the book on particular passages or topics.

The sources include the Mishnah, Tosephta, the two Talmuds, the Tannaite Midrash, the homiletic Midrashim, and the so-called Rabboth, besides smaller and later collections. The editions from which the texts are taken are indicated in the Introduction, so that it is possible to pursue the references when they are made by pages, as has often to be done. On the sources themselves, their age and character, the authorities cited in them, and the various editions, the student will consult Strack's admirable "Einleitung in Talmud und Midrasch" (5th edition, 1921).

The extracts are given in a German translation which is as literal as possible, and on which the reader who is unable to confront the translation with the original may confidently rely. The task of the translator is frequently a very difficult one, because the midrashic interpretation of Biblical texts often turns on peculiarities of expression or on a different pronunciation or combination of Hebrew words, which cannot easily be made apparent in another language; in such cases the hermeneutic procedure is generally explained by the translator.

The work not only supersedes all its predecessors but will forestall successors for a long time to come. It will be indispensable not only to students of the New Testament but to all scholars who concern themselves in any way with the Judaism of the first centuries of the Christian era. A methodical study of even this one volume will yield a knowledge of the normative Judaism in that period which has hitherto been wholly inaccessible to most Christian scholars; and even those who have read most extensively in this vast and dispersed literature will find here the fruits of a lifelong occupation with it, assembled and organized.

A single instance of the wealth of material accumulated must suffice. On Matt. 4, 17, "Repent, for the Kingdom of Heaven is at hand," there are more than twenty closely printed pages, under the heads: Repentance as the condition of the messianic deliverance (pp. 162-165); The efficacy of repentance (pp. 165-170); The nature of repentance (pp. 170-172); The Kingdom of Heaven (of God) — the phrase; the idea of the *Mal-kut Shamaim* in rabbinical literature (pp. 172-180); The conception of the βασιλεία τῶν οὐρανῶν in the Synoptic Gospels compared with the rabbinical conception (pp. 180-184). The last named topic is an example of another signal merit of the book. It not only gives an ample and classified collection of the sources, but discusses their significance, and their bearing on the interpretation of the New Testament and the problems of the beginnings of Christianity.

I cannot conclude an advance notice of this monumental work without urging American scholars, in their own interest as well as that of New Testament learning in general, to give such prompt support to the courageous enterprise of the editor and publisher as shall enable them to carry the work to a speedy completion.

The wider interest among Jews in their national literature has led to the preparation of anthologies in which choice selections from notable poets and prose writers, many of whom are not otherwise easily accessible, are presented. Two such have recently come to the REVIEW, and we are glad to give them notice in its pages. The first, compiled by Dr. B. Halper, of Dropsie College, Philadelphia,³ includes prose extracts as well as poetry, beginning with Ben Sira, brief specimens of the Mishnah, the Babylonian Talmud, and the Midrash. Then follow selections from individual authors in chronological order, from Kalir (probably toward the end of the seventh century) down to Hartwig Wessely (died, 1805), representative of all periods and all the lands of the dispersion; few authors of literary fame

³ Post-Biblical Hebrew Literature: an Anthology. (I) Texts, Notes, and Glossary. (II) English Translation. By B. Halper, M.A., Ph.D. Philadelphia, The Jewish Publication Society of America, 1921. (I, xviii + 300 pp.; II, 251 pp.)

are lacking. Each selection is prefaced by a short note (in English) on the author and his works. The poems and many of the prose passages are furnished with vowel points. Concise notes on various readings or emendations, on references and allusions, and on peculiar difficulties, are appended. The glossary confines itself to words and phrases not found in the Bible, or such as have acquired in postbiblical Hebrew a different meaning.

The second volume gives an English translation as close as English idiom permits. The volumes may therefore well be used by such as desire to acquire a knowledge of postbiblical Hebrew in a wide variety of forms, as well as by those who seek an acquaintance with some of the gems of its literature.

It may be added that the volumes are handsomely printed with the new types of the Jewish Publication Society.

An anthology of poetry only, from the close of the canon to the expulsion of the Jews from Spain in 1492, has been compiled by H. Brody, with the assistance of M. Wiener.⁴ The editors explain in the (Hebrew) preface the principles that guided them in making the selections and their procedure in editing them, and discuss briefly the characteristics of this poetry. An alphabetic index of authors, and an index of the poems themselves by first lines, with indications of the sources from which they are taken, variants, etc., are appended. This volume also is an excellent piece of typography, from the well-known establishment of Drugulin in Leipzig.

⁴ *Anthologia Hebraica. Poemata Selecta a Libris Divinis confectis usque ad Iudaeorum ex Hispania expulsionem* (A. MCCCCXCI), quae digesta atque disposita tractavit H. Brody adiuvante M. Wiener. Leipzig, Insel-Verlag, 1922. (14* + 356 pp.)